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ABSTRACT 
Researcher:  Robert Edward Joslin 
Title:  VALIDATION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY USING LEGACY METRICS: 
EXAMINATION OF SURF-IA ALERTING FOR RUNWAY INCURSION 
INCIDENTS 
Institution:  Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University  
Degree:  Doctor of Philosophy in Aviation  
Year:  2013 
New flight deck technology designed to mitigate runway incursions may not be effective 
in triggering a flight deck alert to avoid high speed surface collisions for runway 
incursions classified as serious by legacy metrics.  This study demonstrated an innovative 
method of utilizing expert raters and actual high-risk incidents to identify shortcomings 
of using legacy metrics to measure the effectiveness of new technology designed to 
mitigate hazardous incidents.  Expert raters were used to validate the Enhanced Traffic 
Situational Awareness on the Airport Surface with Indications and Alerts (SURF-IA) 
model for providing alerts to pilots to reduce the occurrence of pilot deviation type 
runway incursion incidents categorized as serious (Category A or B) by the FAA/ICAO 
Runway Incursion Severity Classification (RISC) model. 
 This study used archival data from Aviation Safety Information Analysis and 
Sharing (ASIAS) incident reports and video reenactments developed by the FAA Office 
of Runway Safety.  Two expert raters reviewed nine pilot deviation type serious runway 
incursion incidents.  The raters applied the baseline minimally compliant implementation 
of the RTCA/DO 323 SURF-IA model to determine which incidents would have an 
iii 
 
alerting SURF-IA outcome.  Inter-rater reliability was determined by percentage 
agreement and Cohen’s kappa and indicated perfect agreement between the raters who 
assessed six of the incidents with a SURF-IA alerting outcome and three as non-alerting.  
Specific aircraft states were identified in the baseline SURF-IA model that precluded an 
outcome of a Warning or Caution alert for all pilot deviation type runway incursion 
incidents classified as serious by the FAA/ICAO RISC model:  (a) wrong runway 
departures, (b) no alert if traffic entered runway after ownship lift-off from same runway, 
and (c) helicopter operations. 
 The study concluded that the SURF-IA model did not yield an outcome of a 
Warning or Caution alert for all pilot deviation type runway incursion incidents classified 
as serious by the FAA/ICAO RISC model.  Even if the SURF-IA model had performed 
to design, the best it could have achieved would have been a 70% alerting outcome for 
incidents classified as serious by the legacy RISC model metric.  In the qualitative 
analysis both raters indicated that neither the legacy RISC definition of on-runway nor 
the SURF-IA definition was appropriate.  Hence, the raters’ recommendation was not to 
adopt either model’s definition, but rather develop an entirely new definition through 
further study.  The raters were explicit about the criticality of appropriate and harmonized 
definitions used in the models. 
The different outcomes between the RISC and SURF-IA models may result in 
misleading information when using the reduction in serious runway incursion incidents 
as a metric for the benefit of SURF-IA technology.  It is recommended that prior to using 
the ASIAS runway incursion data as a metric for the benefit of SURF-IA, the FAA 
develop a process for identifying and tracking ASIAS reported PD type serious runway 
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incursion incidents which will not trigger a SURF-IA alert.  Consideration should be 
made to improving the SURF-IA model technical capabilities to accommodate all 
possible aircraft states that the RISC model would classify as serious runway incursion 
incidents. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) predicts that domestic passenger 
capacity will grow from 731 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 to 1.2 billion in FY 2032 
(FAA, 2011a).  To accommodate the demand for additional capacity in a safe and 
efficient manner, the FAA has implemented the Next Generation Air Transportation 
System (NextGen).  NextGen is a comprehensive overhaul of the National Airspace 
System (NAS) that integrates new and existing communication, navigation, and 
surveillance technologies.  The cornerstone enabling technology to accommodate the 
growth in the number and frequency of aircraft operations, both in the air and on the 
ground, will be a satellite-based navigation and surveillance system that implements 
various applications of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) (FAA, 
2011b, 2012a, 2012b). 
The FAA forecasts that airport tower operations associated with the increased 
domestic capacity will increase by 23% between FY 2012 and FY 2032, which 
corresponds to an increased number of runway operations (FAA, 2011a).  As a proactive 
measure for mitigating runway incursions, in 2011 the FAA issued Advisory Circular 
(AC) 20-172 -Airworthiness Approval for ADS-B(In) Systems and Applications, which 
included Enhanced Traffic Situational Awareness on the Airport Surface with Indications 
and Alerts (SURF-IA) as one of the NextGen ADS-B(In) applications (FAA, 2011b). 
The deadliest accident in worldwide aviation history occurred on March 27, 1977, 
and involved a runway incursion and collision of two B-747 aircraft at Tenerife in the 
Canary Islands resulting in 583 fatalities (http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/mwl-4.html).  Since 
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1990, there have been seven fatal runway incursion accidents in the United States 
resulting in 112 fatalities, the deadliest of which occurred in 2006 with 49 fatalities 
(Table 1) (NTSB, 2007). 
 
 
Table 1 
 
Fatal U.S. runway incursion accidents 1990-2012 
 
Year Location Airline/Flight Aircraft Fatalities 
2006 Lexington, KY  Comair 5191 CL-600 49 
2000 Sarasota, FL N89827/N79960 C-152, C-172 4 
1996 Quincy, IL United Express 
5925/N1127D 
Beech 1900, King 
Air A90 
14 
1994 St. Louis, MO TWA 
427/N441KM 
MD 82, C441 2 
1991 Los Angeles, CA  USAir 1493/ 
SkyWest 5569 
B-737, Metroliner 34 
1990 Detroit, MI NWA 
1482/NWA 299 
DC-9, B-727 8 
1990 Atlanta, GA EAL 
111/N44UE 
B-727, King Air 
A100 
1 
Note: Adapted from the NTSB database website 
http://www.ntsb.gov/aviationquery/index.aspx and ALPA website 
http://www.alpa.org/portals/alpa/runwaysafety/NTSBRunwaySafetyfact sheet.pdf 
 
 
 
On June 30, 2010, the FAA chartered an Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) 
for ADS-B(In) that recommended the implementation of SURF-IA to mitigate runway 
incursions as one of the top ten ADS-B(In) priorities to support NextGen (ADS-B, 2011).  
SURF-IA is a new avionics system that alerts pilots of potentially dangerous runway 
incursions.  Runway incursions are defined by the FAA and International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) as the incorrect presence of an aircraft on a surface designated for 
takeoff and landing, and are grouped into three types: (a) operational error/ deviation/ 
incident (OE/D/I), (b) vehicle-pedestrian deviation (V/PD), and (c) pilot deviation (PD) 
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(FAA, 2009; ICAO, 2007).  For over two decades the FAA has used the rate and number 
of runway incursions as a metric for measuring runway safety; however, there has not 
been a significant reduction in runway incursions.  The ADS-B(In) ARC proposed using 
the change in rate of PD type runway incursions as the FAA metric for assessing the 
benefit and effectiveness of SURF-IA flight deck technology as a mitigation for runway 
incursions (ADS-B, 2011).  Pilot deviation type runway incursions comprised over 60% 
of all runway incursions, which are the type of runway incursion that SURF-IA was 
designed to mitigate.  The FAA Office of Runway Safety tracks and classifies runway 
incursions using a Runway Incursion Severity Classification (RISC) model (FAA, 2006, 
August).  However, the RISC model used by the FAA for classification of a runway 
incursion differs from the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) 
developed model used to activate SURF-IA flight deck alerts of a runway incursion that 
will be displayed to pilots (Cardosi, Hannon, Sheridan, & Davis, 2005; FAA, 2007a; 
RTCA, 2010).  When introducing new technology, the FAA often utilizes international 
consensus organizations, such as RTCA and the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE), 
to develop specifications, requirements, and standards, which the FAA then adopts in part 
or in toto as regulatory guidance. 
 This study evaluated the effectiveness of the SURF-IA model for providing alerts 
to pilots to reduce the occurrence of PD type serious (Category A or B) runway incursion 
incidents as defined by the RISC model.  Quantitative data were used to identify the state 
of ownship (vernacular for pilot’s own aircraft) and traffic aircraft for incidents when the 
outcome severity of the SURF-IA model was not validated by matching the outcome 
severity of the RISC model.  Qualitative data were used to describe specific aircraft 
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states and factors in the models.  The aircraft states were defined by the true position of 
ownship and traffic aircraft in the runway environment.  The practical findings of this 
study may be used to: 
(a) specify recommendations for modifications that may enhance the SURF-IA and RISC 
models, and (b) utilize the modifications to enhance validation of metrics for measuring 
the benefits of SURF-IA technology.  Furthermore, the implications of this study’s 
approach, which assessed the validity of using legacy metrics to measure the 
effectiveness of new flight deck technology, can be applied to other emerging NextGen 
flight deck technology that have measurable operational outcomes.  Traditional or legacy 
metrics that have been historically used to assess existing technology may have little or 
no meaning for the models and algorithms utilized in new technology.  For example, 
Traffic Situation Awareness with Alerts (TSAA) is another NextGen technology that will 
enhance safety in general aviation (GA) aircraft by providing flight deck alerts to 
mitigate aircraft mid-air collisions (FAA, 2012a).  The FAA (2012c) defines a Near Mid-
Air Collision (NMAC) as an incident associated with the operation of an aircraft in which 
the possibility of collision has been reported by one of the involved flight crew, and 
results in a recorded proximity of less than 500 feet vertical and 0.5 nautical miles lateral 
to another aircraft.  The effectiveness of TSAA technology will likely be measured 
through NMAC reports, which are tracked through the Aviation Safety Information and 
Analysis System (ASIAS); however, the algorithm that triggers flight deck alerts for the 
proposed TSAA system may have a model with different aircraft proximity thresholds.  
Hence, an aircraft with TSAA on a flight deck display may be presented with information 
that safe separation was maintained from another aircraft, but may still precipitate a 
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NMAC report from the other traffic.  This study provided a methodological framework 
for evaluating legacy metrics to ensure they present valid indications of the safety 
performance of new technology.  The methodology can be extended to other 
transportation modes as well as medicine, law enforcement, nuclear power-plants, and 
other safety critical fields. 
Runway Incursion Defined 
In October 2007, the FAA adopted the ICAO definition of runway incursion as 
any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle, 
or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of 
aircraft.  The revised definition expanded the legacy FAA definition to include surface 
incidents and wrong runway departures.  In addition, the revised definition changed some 
of the descriptors for the categories and types of runway incursions (Figure 1) (FAA, 
2009). 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  FAA definition of runway incursion severity classifications.  Adapted from the 
“National Runway Safety Plan 2009-2011,” by the FAA, 2009. 
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Runway incursions are only reported and tracked by the FAA Office of Runway 
Safety at airports that have an operating air traffic control tower (FAA, 2009).  The FAA 
defines Category A and Category B runway incursions as serious incidents. 
Runway Incursion Statistics 
FAA runway incursion data for FY 2008 through FY 2012 indicate that there has 
been an increase in the rate and the number of runway incursions (Figures 2 and 3).  
Although there have been other types of aviation related accidents and incidents on the 
runway surface, such as runway excursions and loss of control (LOC) on the ground, both 
the FAA and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) consider runway 
incursions as the top surface hazard (FAA, 2012b; NTSB, 2012). 
The most prevalent type of runway incursion was caused by a pilot deviation, 
defined by the Flight Standards Information Management System (FSMIS) as actions of a 
pilot that resulted in a failure to comply with air traffic control (ATC) clearance and/or 
instructions (Figure 2).  The overall rate of runway incursions per million operations from 
FY 2008 to FY 2012 increased from 17.16 to 21.02, of which over 60% were PD type in 
every year (Figure 3).  Pilot deviation type runway incursions are the type of runway 
incursions intended to be mitigated by SURF-IA. 
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Figure 2.  Runway incursions FY 2008-FY 2012.  Adapted from http://www.faa.gov/ 
airports/runway_safety/ statistics  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Rate of runway incursions FY 2008-FY 2012.  Adapted from 
http://www/faa.gov/airports/runway_safety/ 
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Benefits of Runway Incursion Mitigation 
Aviation rulemaking committees, which are chartered by the FAA, conduct 
benefit-cost analyses as part of their evaluations of  investments in new technology that 
are subject to FAA decision-making, such as SURF-IA (FAA, 2007b).  All costs incurred 
(or costs avoided) that may result from proposed FAA investments and regulations are 
considered in the analyses.  Avoided accidents are one of the principal benefits and are 
valued using the avoided injury and property damage costs recommended in the FAA 
Guide for Economic Values for FAA Investment and Regulatory Decisions (FAA, 
2007b).  Accurately quantifying benefits of SURF-IA in terms of avoidance of hull loss 
and fatalities is difficult because, fortunately, there have been few actual runway 
incursion accidents.  However, the ADS-B(In) ARC report estimated the benefits from 
avoidance of runway incursions from FY 2011-FY 2025 to be $55M for the U.S. 
domestic air transport community alone (ADS-B, 2011). 
 
Risk management in aviation illustrates how organizations cooperate, by 
capturing near miss information to augment the sparse history of crashes and 
injuries.  Data from incident reporting systems on near misses have been 
effectively used to redesign aircraft, air traffic control systems, airports, and pilot 
training, and to reduce human error (Barach & Small, 2000, p. 762). 
 
Considering Category A and Category B runway incursion incidents, and not just 
accidents in the benefit analysis for SURF-IA, would follow historical precedents such as 
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the mandate for Collision Avoidance System (CAS), which considered mid-air collision 
(MAC) accidents along with near mid-air collision incidents. 
The language in the economic analysis in the rulemaking for CAS demonstrated 
the precedent for using incident data to supplement accident data for the benefit analysis 
of new flight deck technology (Collision Avoidance Systems, 2003). 
 
It is assumed that the risk of a near mid-air collision (NMAC) is proportional to 
the pair probabilities.  The risk of a NMAC is used rather than the risk of a MAC, 
because most of the statistical models used in studying the safety of TCAS II 
were derived from encounter data and not from MAC data.  (CAS, 2003, p.15896) 
 
Based in part on the Collision Avoidance System (2003) precedent, the ADS-
B(In) ARC report recommended measuring reduced frequency of pilot deviation type 
runway incursion incidents associated with the use of SURF-IA flight deck technology, 
to assess the effectiveness and benefit of the new technology (ADS-B, 2011). 
 
The ARC recommends the FAA analyze the rate of pilot deviation type runway 
incursions at the 44 airports where the SURF-IA ADS-B(In) application is 
initially implemented to assess the application’s benefits.  (ADS-B, 2011, p. 45) 
 
SURF-IA Model 
The SURF-IA Safety and Performance Interoperability Requirements (SPR) were 
developed through the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) Special 
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Committee 186 (SC-186) based on studies by Jones and Prinzel (2006), and Prinzel and 
Jones (2006).  Using ADS-B technology, SURF-IA mitigates runway incursions by 
enhancing pilot situation awareness of other aircraft through a Cockpit Display of Traffic 
Information (CDTI) (Jones & Prinzel, 2006; Jones, Prinzel, Otero, & Barker, 2009; 
Moertl & Nickum, 2008; Prinzel & Jones, 2006).  SURF-IA technology, enabled by 
ADS-B(In), was designed for use by pilots operating within the airport surface movement 
area. 
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast is the FAA's satellite-based 
successor to radar.  ADS-B makes use of Global Positioning System (GPS) technology to 
determine and share precise aircraft location information, and streams additional flight 
information to the flight deck of properly equipped aircraft.  It is automatic because no 
interrogation from an external source is required for operation, and it is dependent 
because it relies on on-board equipment to provide surveillance information (i.e., 
position, altitude, speed, and heading) obtained from a GPS receiver (RTCA, 2010).  Any 
user within line-of-sight broadcast range can receive and process ADS-B messages using 
an appropriate receiver.  The CDTI is enhanced with SURF-IA visual alerts, aural alerts, 
and indications that highlight traffic and runway status through alphanumeric information 
and symbology (Figure 4) (Jones & Prinzel, 2006; Jones, Prinzel, Otero, & Barker, 2009; 
Jones et al., 2010; RTCA, 2010). 
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Figure 4.  Conceptual cockpit display of a Warning alert from SURF-IA.  Adapted from 
“Safety, Performance and Interoperability Requirements Document for Enhanced Traffic 
Situational Awareness on the Airport Surface with Indications and Alerts (SURF-IA),” 
by Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA/DO-323). 
 
 
 
The starting point for the Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) 
of the model for SURF-IA alerting are set forth in the Safety and Performance 
Interoperability Requirements (SPR) Document developed by RTCA (2010).  The SPR 
identified the baseline SURF-IA model as the version with limitations to the technical 
capabilities for 
• alerting and indications about potential collisions in airport ramp areas; 
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• alerting and indications about potential collisions on airport taxiways;  
• technological integration between ground-based alerting logic and flight deck 
based alerting logic; 
• SURF-IA for helicopters;  
• SURF-IA for ground vehicles; 
• explicit consideration of aircraft movement intent information.  This version 
inferred movement intent based on current traffic position and movement (e.g., 
takeoff, landing, crossing); 
• detection of wrong runway usage (including closed runways), unless there is 
conflicting traffic; 
• alerting after lift-off; 
• use of CDTI and indications for surface movement efficiency, such as supporting 
taxi-operations during low visibility conditions; 
• directive alerting; 
• predictive alerting. 
 
Runway Incursion Severity Classification (RISC) Model 
The RISC model was based on the research conducted by Sheridan (2004), 
Sheridan, Cardosi, and Hannon (2004), and Cardosi, Hannon, Sheridan, and Davis 
(2005).  It has been used since 2006 by the FAA Office of Runway Safety as part of its 
quality management system (QMS) to validate runway incursion severity classifications 
(FAA, 2006, August; FAA, 2011a, March; FAA, 2011b, March).  A computer program 
that  automated the RISC model was developed by the FAA and VOLPE National 
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Transportation System Center with the aim of standardizing assessments of runway 
incursion events among the FAA and ICAO member states (ICAO, 2007).  The primary 
factors considered in the RISC model were horizontal/vertical proximity of the aircraft 
and/or vehicle/pedestrian, geometry of the encounter, evasive or corrective action, 
available reaction time, environmental conditions, and factors that affected system 
performance such as communication failures/errors (Figure 5). 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Runway Incursion Severity Classification calculator.  Adapted from the 
“Manual on the Prevention of Runway Incursions,” by ICAO, 2007. 
 
 
 
The RISC model was initially developed from research conducted by Sheridan, Cardosi, 
and Hannon (2004) for rating the severity of close-call events in transportation, medicine, 
 
 
14 
 
police, and security, and then refined by Sheridan (2004) and Cardosi, Hannon, Sheridan, 
and Davis (2005) to specifically focus on runway incursions. 
The ICAO (2007) Manual on the Prevention of Runway Incursions cited Sheridan 
(2004) as the governing document that provided the mathematics behind the RISC model 
for objectively categorizing runway incursion incidents as Category A, B, or C.  
Sheridan’s (2004) so-called interpolation method for rating severity of runway incursions 
established a priori criteria and rules for the RISC model based on the objective factual 
data and quantitative estimates extracted from ATC runway incursion reports used by the 
FAA Office of Runway Safety to classify incidents.  The model identified a set of 
independent runway incursion scenarios (e.g., one landing aircraft, one taxiing aircraft) 
that broadly subsumed all incursions.  The baseline severity was determined by closest 
horizontal or vertical proximity for the given scenario.  A smaller set of common scalable 
factors (e.g., visibility, ceiling, Runway Visual Range (RVR), day/night) rated on a 10-
point scale were used to further characterize the severity of the scenario beyond aircraft 
proximity.  For cases where the scalable factors were all zero, closest proximity alone 
was adequate to characterize the severity of the incident.  Each factor’s weighted score 
was used to calculate a final score that determined the severity category.  The Runway 
Incursion Severity Classification (RISC) calculator is a computer program that classifies 
the outcome of runway incursions into one of three severity categories: “A”, “B”, or “C”.  
Category D runway incursions are considered non-conflicting (Figure 1).  The calculator 
was populated with data extracted from pilot deviation reports (FAA Form 8020-17) of 
runway incursions submitted by the ATC personnel who observed the incident (FAA, 
2007a, 2007c, 2010a). 
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 In the initial RISC validation, the model ratings matched the ratings from the 
FAA Office of Runway Safety in only 67% of the cases.  Hence, Cardosi, Hannon, 
Sheridan, and Davis (2005) recommended the incorporation of the following 
improvements to the RISC model prior to formal implementation by the FAA and ICAO:  
(a) only consider closest proximity achieved unintentionally; (b) not consider an incident 
where ATC directed participating aircraft to intentionally and knowingly taxi toward 
each other on the same runway; and (c) classify aircraft fly-over or land-over scenarios as 
Category B instead of Category C. 
 Following the aforementioned model adjustments, the FAA (2006, August) 
assessed the RISC as valid and reliable and formalized its use by the FAA Office of 
Runway Safety Quality Management System (QMS) process for runway incursion 
severity classification (FAA, 2011a, March; FAA, 2011b, March).  The International 
Civil Aviation Organization (2007) also formalized the use of the Runway Incursion 
Severity Classification (RISC) computer program for modeling and standardizing the 
classification of outcomes from runway incursions to provide consistent ratings by 
applying the same decision processes used by expert raters from the FAA and ICAO 
(FAA, 2006, August; FAA, 2011a, March; FAA, 2011b, March; ICAO, 2007).  ICAO 
asserted that, “such consistency is deemed essential for being able to examine trends over 
time or see the effects of mitigation strategies” (ICAO, 2007, p. H-1). 
 
RISC and SURF-IA Model Comparison 
The RISC model was based primarily on aircraft state, environmental factors, and 
non-temporal quantitative factors for closest horizontal or vertical (overflight) proximity 
and could consider ATC intervention for intentional incursions.  The SURF-IA model for 
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alerts relied on GPS derived quantitative aircraft state factors that considered horizontal 
and vertical proximity as well as temporal closure considerations.  However, the 
proximity information entered into the RISC model from ATC deviation reports at times 
was based on subjective observations of incidents with regard to how close two aircraft 
came to colliding, rather than the precise GPS derived instrument readings for position 
and time that were used in SURF-IA (GAO, 2007).  An overview of the primary model 
factors is provided in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2 
 
Comparison of primary model factors for RISC and SURF-IA 
  
Factors for Model FAA RISC Model SURF-IA Alerts Model 
Horizontal Separation  √ √ 
Vertical Separation √ √ 
Aircraft Geometry √ √ 
Runway Visual Range √ × 
Ceiling/Visibility √ × 
Braking Condition √ × 
Closure Rate × √ 
Day/Night √ × 
VMC/IMC √ × 
Aircraft Size √ × 
Aircraft Maneuver √ √ 
Human Errors √ × 
ATC Intervention √ × 
On-Runway Criteria Hold Short Line Runway Shoulder 
Distance from Runway < 1 mile from runway threshold ≤  35 secs to runway 
threshold 
√  Considered × Not considered  
Note: Adapted from “Safety, performance and interoperability requirements document for enhanced traffic 
situational awareness on the airport surface with indications and alerts (SURF-IA),” by Radio Technical 
Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA), 2010, and “A method for rating the severity of runway incursions,” 
by Cardosi, et al., Proceedings of the USA/Europe 6th Air Traffic Management Research and Development 
Seminar, 2005. 
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Other comparisons between SURF-IA alerting model and the RISC model for a 
serious (Category A or Category B) classification that could affect the outcomes were as 
follows: 
1) SURF-IA model will alert when conflicting aircraft is within 35 
seconds of the runway threshold (RTHRE), while the RISC model 
considers traffic at less than one nautical mile (nm) from the runway 
threshold as a serious runway incursion. 
2) Even when a take-off clearance was cancelled by ATC, SURF-IA will 
alert when conflicting traffic was on the same runway with either 
aircraft moving at greater than 40 knots with closure.  The RISC model 
accounted for air traffic controller instructions and interventions. 
3) SURF-IA will alert for any conflicting traffic operating below 1000 
feet above the airfield elevation (AFE) with horizontal and/or vertical 
closure, while the RISC model for a serious incident typically requires 
less than 4000 feet horizontal separation or less than 100 feet vertical 
overflight separation. 
4) The SURF-IA model defined an on-runway condition for an aircraft 
not lined up with the runway as any part of the aircraft inside the 
runway shoulder.  The SURF-IA model also considered an aircraft to 
have met the on-runway condition when it was approximately lined-up 
with the runway and was within one runway width of the runway 
centerline (Figure 6).  However, the FAA (2010a) Runway Safety 
Program and the RISC model defined an on-runway condition to be 
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when any part of the aircraft was inside the runway hold position 
markings (i.e., hold line), which was encompassed by the runway 
safety area (RSA).  A comparative depiction of the on-runway 
condition for the SURF-IA model and RISC model is provided in 
Figure 7 (FAA, 1989, 2010a; RTCA, 2010). 
 
 
 
Figure 6. SURF-IA on-runway conditions. Adapted from “Safety, performance and 
interoperability requirements document for enhanced traffic situational awareness on the 
airport surface with indications and alerts (SURF-IA),” by RTCA, 2010. 
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Figure 7.  U.S. airport surface geometry on-runway points.  Adapted from “Safety, 
performance and interoperability requirements document for enhanced traffic situational 
awareness on the airport surface with indications and alerts (SURF-IA),” by RTCA, 
2010, “Runway Safety Program,” by FAA, 2010.“Airport Design,” by FAA, 1989. 
 
 
 
Statement of the Problem 
The SURF-IA model may not trigger a flight deck Warning or Caution alert to 
prompt pilot action for pilot deviation type runway incursions classified by the 
FAA/ICAO RISC model as serious (Category A or Category B) to avoid a potential high 
speed surface collision between two aircraft. 
 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this study was to use actual runway incursion incidents to validate 
the SURF-IA model for providing alerts to pilots to reduce the occurrence of pilot 
deviation type serious (Category A or B) runway incursion incidents as defined by the 
      
       
FAA Order 7050.1A 
and RISC Model “On 
Runway” point 
SURF-IA “On 
Runway” point 
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RISC model.  The study used two expert raters to determine if the SURF-IA model would 
have provided an alert for the scenarios from archived historical ASIAS reports of pilot 
deviation type runway incursion incidents classified as serious (Category A or B) by the 
RISC model. 
 
Research Questions 
 Does the SURF-IA model yield an outcome of a Warning or Caution alert for 
runway incursion incidents classified as serious (Category A or B) by the FAA/ICAO 
RISC model? What are the aircraft states in the SURF-IA model that preclude an 
outcome of a Warning or Caution alert for runway incursion incidents classified as 
serious (Category A or Category B) by the FAA/ICAO RISC model? 
 
 
Significance of the Study 
For over a decade, the reduction of runway incursions has been a top strategic 
objective for the FAA and also identified as one of aviation’s most critical continuing 
challenges by the National Transportation Safety Board, European Aviation Safety 
Agency (EASA), and the International Civil Aviation Organization (EASA, 2010; FAA, 
2012b; ICAO, 2007; NTSB, 2012).  From FY 2005-FY 2010 over 60% of runway 
incursions were from pilot deviations (FAA, 2009, 2011c).  The FAA opens an 
enforcement investigation upon receipt of a pilot deviation report (FAA Form 8020-17) 
for a runway incursion that involves possible regulatory violations (FAA, 2007a, 2007c, 
2010a).  If the investigation reveals a violation of an FAA regulation, the pilot may be 
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subject to legal enforcement action such as pilot certificate action or civil penalty (FAA, 
2007c, 2010a, 2010c). 
One of the NextGen technological mitigations for runway incursions will be flight 
deck alerts using SURF-IA.  The metric to measure the benefit of SURF-IA as a runway 
incursion mitigation strategy will be assessed by the FAA Office of Runway Safety 
through analysis of statistics for change in the rate of pilot deviation type runway 
incursions using the legacy RISC criteria (ADS-B, 2011).  Different outcome severities 
from the RISC and SURF-IA models, when applied to the same runway incursion 
incident, may result in misleading information when using the reduction in runway 
incursion incidents classified as serious by the RISC model as the metric for assessing the 
effectiveness and benefit of SURF-IA technology.  The outcome differences may also 
result in a pilot not receiving a Warning or Caution alert from the SURF-IA flight deck 
technology for an event that would be categorized and reportable to the FAA by the RISC 
model as a serious runway incursion, and may result in legal disputes over FAA 
enforcement actions for runway incursions from pilot deviations (OSC, 2008). 
 
Delimitations 
Only pilot deviation (PD) type runway incursion incidents of Category A and 
Category B that occurred in the United States between FY 2007-FY 2012 for which the 
FAA Office of Runway Safety created video-reenactments were considered in this study.  
The SURF-IA logic for this study only considered alerts and did not include or consider 
SURF-IA indications.  Hence, the raters only rated whether or not a SURF-IA alert 
would have been triggered, without considering whether or not a runway incursion would 
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have been avoided.  The study did not evaluate the physical location of the SURF-IA 
alert annunciation on the CDTI in the pilot’s field-of-view, navigational positional 
accuracy, or aircraft deceleration/braking performance. 
For the SURF-IA model, any incident that would have triggered an alert 
(Warning or Caution) was coded as an alerting incident and considered equivalent to a 
Category A or Category B serious runway incursion from the RISC model.  Any other 
outcome was coded as a non-alerting incident, hence not a serious incident.  OE/D/I 
incidents were used in the pilot study as surrogates for PD type incidents in order to 
maximize the number of PD type incidents available for the main study.  
 
Limitations and Assumptions 
This analysis assumed that the flight deck SURF-IA alerting system assessed in 
this study complied with the baseline minimum performance requirements stipulated in 
the Safety, Performance, and Interoperability Requirements (SPR) Document RTCA/DO 
323 developed by RTCA (2010) with the known limitations as published in the SPR 
(Table 3).  The FAA conducted a study on the risk mitigation related to ADS-B surface 
detection performance issues in support of future ADS-B surface applications such as 
SURF-IA, and identified necessary improvements to the airport ground infrastructure to 
resolve operational SURF-IA issues (FAA, 2012d).  As of 2012, the FAA had identified 
44 airports already outfitted or in the process of being equipped with the necessary 
ground infrastructure to resolve the operational SURF-IA issues of multi-path, drop-outs, 
line-of-sight, and position accuracy on the ground (FAA, 2012a, 2012d).  This study 
assumed that the airports where the incidents occurred had the overall infrastructure 
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necessary to support aircraft operating with minimally compliant SURF-IA systems that 
would alert per RTCA/DO-323. 
 
 
Table 3 
Capabilities not in baseline SURF-IA  
 
Alerting and indications about potential collisions in airport ramp areas 
Alerting and indications about potential collisions on airport taxiways  
Technological integration between ground-based alerting logic and flight deck based 
alerting logic 
SURF IA for helicopters 
SURF IA for ground vehicle 
Explicit consideration of aircraft movement intent information.  This version inferred 
movement intent based on current traffic position and movement (e.g., take-off, 
landing, crossing) 
Detection of wrong runway usage (including closed runways) in absence of a conflict 
traffic 
Alerting after lift-off 
Use of CDTI and indications for surface movement efficiency such as supporting taxi-
operations during low visibility conditions 
Directive alerting 
Predictive alerting 
Note: Adapted from “Safety, Performance and Interoperability Requirements Document 
for Enhanced Traffic Situational Awareness on the Airport Surface with Indications and 
Alerts (SURF-IA),” by Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA/DO-323), 
2010. 
 
 
 
 By definition, a runway incursion incident classified as serious (Category A or B) 
required an immediate or time critical response by the pilot in either aircraft, which is 
analogous to SURF-IA alerts (Warning or Caution) that also require a similar pilot 
response as shown in Table 4.  In the event a runway incursion is in progress, or about to 
occur, incursion detection and aural/graphical alerting on the flight deck by the SURF-IA 
model allows evasive or corrective action to be taken immediately (Green, 2006).  Hence, 
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it was assumed that a serious (Category A or Category B) runway incursion outcome 
from the RISC model was equivalent, in terms of potential outcome severity, to a SURF-
IA alert outcome.  The model for SURF-IA used the 14CFR §25.1322 definition of an 
alert, modified to only consider Warnings and Cautions and not Advisories (FAA, 2010b, 
RTCA, 2010).  During the development of the SURF-IA model, Jones and Prinzel (2006) 
mapped Category A and Category B serious runway incursion incidents to SURF-IA 
alerts, which was consistent with the U.S.C. 14CFR §25.1322 and associated FAA 
(2010b) Advisory Circular definition for a Warning or Caution alert (Table 4).  Whereas 
the FAA (2010b) defined three possible levels of alerting (Warning, Caution, and 
Advisory), SURF-IA alerts only considered Warnings and Cautions, which are 
annunciated for traffic in non-normal operational conditions when a conflict is predicted 
on the airport surface (RTCA, 2010).  SURF-IA also provided Runway Status Indications 
(RSI) and Traffic Indications (TI) for traffic in normal operational conditions, consisting 
only of runway and/or traffic highlighting on a CDTI with no aural annunciations.  The 
RSI and TI indications are intended to remind the pilot to verify runway status prior to 
proceeding and to increase the flight crews’ situational awareness about particular 
relevant traffic that could affect runway safety, but do not require any time critical or 
immediate action.  
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Table 4 
Runway incursion category vs. SURF-IA Alerting 
 
FAA Definition of Serious Runway Incursion SURF-IA Definition of Alerting 
Runway Incursion 
Category A:  A serious incident in which a 
collision was narrowly avoided 
Warning alert:  Requires immediate 
flight crew awareness and immediate 
flight crew response 
Category B:  An incident in which separation 
decreases and there is significant potential for a 
collision, which may result in time critical 
corrective/evasive response to avoid a collision 
Caution alert: Requires immediate 
flight crew awareness and subsequent 
flight crew response 
Note: Adapted from “Safety, Performance and Interoperability Requirements Document for Enhanced 
Traffic Situational Awareness on the Airport Surface with Indications and Alerts (SURF-IA),” by Radio 
Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA/DO-323), 2010, and from “Manual on the prevention of 
runway incursions” by ICAO, 2007. 
 
 
 
The following statistical assumptions for inter-rater reliability were made based 
on Cohen (1960):  (a) coding of either alerting or non-alerting was mutually exclusive, 
independent, and collectively exhaustive; (b) runway incursion incidents were 
independent events; and (c) each rater generated a rating without knowledge and without 
influence of the other rater’s rating. 
 
Disclaimer 
 The research presented in this study was solely from the author and does not 
represent an official position of the Federal Aviation Administration or the Department of 
Transportation.  The use of trademarks or names of manufacturers in this study was for 
accurate reporting and does not constitute an official endorsement, either expressed or 
implied, of such products or manufacturers. 
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Definition of Terms 
Advisory Requires flight crew awareness and may require subsequent flight crew 
response 
Alert A generic term to describe a flight deck annunciation, meant to attract 
the attention of, and identify to the flight-crew a non-normal operational 
or aircraft system condition. 
Automatic 
Dependent 
Surveillance 
Broadcast 
A function on an aircraft or surface vehicle operating within the surface 
movement area that periodically broadcasts its state vector (horizontal 
and vertical position, horizontal and vertical velocity) and other 
information.  ADS-B is automatic because no external stimulus is 
required to elicit a transmission.  It is dependent because it relies on on-
board navigation sources and on-board broadcast transmission systems 
to provide surveillance information to other users. 
Category A A serious runway incursion incident in which a collision was narrowly 
avoided. 
Category B A runway incursion incident in which separation decreases and there is 
significant potential for a collision, which may result in time critical 
corrective/evasive response to avoid a collision. 
Category C A runway incursion incident characterized by ample time and/or 
distance to avoid a collision. 
Category D An incident that meets the definition of runway incursion such as the 
incorrect presence of a single vehicle/person/aircraft on the protected 
area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft but 
with no immediate safety consequences. 
Caution Requires immediate flight crew awareness and a less urgent subsequent 
flight crew response than a Warning alert. 
Convergence Progressively decreasing distance between ownship and traffic 
determined either by position reports, or velocity and directionality 
False Alert An incorrect or spurious alert caused by failure of the alerting system 
including the sensor. 
Fly-over When an aircraft attempts to land on the same runway and aborts the 
landing and flies over the traffic.  
Indication Identify to the flight crew a normal operational condition that could 
become a runway safety hazard.  Indications do not actively attract 
attention from flight crews but provide enhanced situation relevant 
information to facilitate flight crew perception of safety hazards 
(Indications are not Alerts). 
Land-over When an aircraft attempts to land on the same runway and lands over 
the traffic. 
Missed Alert Condition where an alert is needed but not provided. 
Nuisance 
Alert 
An alert generated by a system that is functioning as designed but is 
inappropriate or unnecessary for the particular condition. 
Ownship Vernacular for pilot’s own aircraft. 
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Pilot 
Deviation 
Actions of a pilot that resulted in a failure to comply with air traffic 
control (ATC) clearance and/or instructions. 
Runway 
Excursion 
When an aircraft on the runway surface departs the end (overrun) or the 
side (veer-off) of the runway surface during a take-off or landing. 
Runway 
Incursion 
Any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an 
aircraft, vehicle, or person on the protected area of a surface designated 
for the landing and take-off of aircraft. 
Warning Requires immediate flight crew awareness and immediate flight crew 
response. 
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List of Acronyms 
AC Advisory Circular 
ACSS Aviation Communication and Surveillance Systems 
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast 
AFE Airfield Elevation 
ALPA Air Line Pilots Association 
ARC Aviation Rulemaking Committee 
ASDE-X Airport Surface Detection Equipment-Model X 
ASIAS Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing 
ASRS Aviation Safety Reporting System 
ATC Air Traffic Control 
ATCAM Airport Traffic Collision Avoidance Model 
BI Bias Index 
CAS Collision Avoidance System 
CDTI Cockpit Display of Traffic Information 
CFR Code of Federal Regulations 
CHS Charleston International Airport 
CY Calendar Year 
DAB Daytona Beach International Airport 
DEN Denver International Airport 
DFW Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport 
DO Document 
DVT Phoenix Deer Valley Airport 
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EASA European Aviation Safety Agency 
ERAU Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FY Fiscal Year 
FSIMS Flight Standards Information Management Systems 
GA General Aviation 
GBA Ground-Based Alerting 
GFK Grand Forks International Airport 
GPS Global Positioning System 
HPN White Plains/Westchester County Airport 
HQR Handling Qualities Rating 
HWO Hollywood/North Perry Airport 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions 
IRB Institutional Review Board 
JFK New York/John F. Kennedy International Airport 
LACM Low Altitude Conflict Monitor 
LAHSO Land and Hold Short 
LOC Loss of Control 
MAC Mid-Air Collision 
MKE Milwaukee/General Mitchell International Airport 
MOPS Minimum Operational Performance Standards 
NAS National Airspace System 
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NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NextGen Next Generation Air Transportation System 
nm Nautical Mile 
NMAC Near Mid-Air Collision 
NPRM Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board 
OE/D/I Operational Error/Deviation/Incident 
PABAK Prevalence-Adjusted Bias-Adjusted Kappa 
PD Pilot Deviation 
PDARS Performance Data Analysis and Reporting System 
PHL Philadelphia International Airport 
PI Prevalence Index 
QMS Quality Management System 
RIAAS Runway Incursion Advisory and Alerting System 
RIPS Runway Incursion Prevention System 
RISC Runway Incursion Severity Classification 
RSA Runway Safety Area 
RSI Runway Status Indication 
RSM Runway Safety Monitor 
RTCA Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics 
RTHRE Runway Threshold 
RVR Runway Visual Range 
SAE Society of Automotive Engineers 
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SC Special Committee 
SEA Seattle-Tacoma International Airport 
SPR Safety and Performance Interoperability Requirements 
SPSS Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
SSAP Surface Surveillance Analysis Platform 
SURF-IA Enhanced Traffic Situational Awareness on the Airport Surface 
with Indications and Alerts  
 
TCM Taxi Conflict Monitor 
TCAS Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System  
TI Traffic Indication 
TSAA Traffic Situation Awareness with Alerts 
VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions 
V/PD Vehicle/Pedestrian Deviation 
WAL  Wallops Flight Facility  
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE 
 The literature review indicated a gap in the body of knowledge in three areas 
relevant to this study as related to SURF-IA model outcomes: assessment of inter-rater 
reliability, validity of scenarios, and validity of runway incursion type to determine 
SURF-IA outcomes relevant to a cockpit display of traffic information (CDTI).  None  
of the other studies in the literature review focused exclusively on PD type runway 
incursion incidents or serious (Category A and Category B) incidents.  This study was 
confined to pilot deviations, which were the type of incidents the FAA has proposed to 
use as a metric to assess the benefit of SURF-IA.  Furthermore, previous SURF-IA 
studies that rated outcomes did not provide any measure of inter-rater reliability, and 
researchers conducted their analyses primarily based on generalized data from scenarios 
said to be representative of actual runway incursion incidents.  This study improved on 
the reliability and validity of previous studies by measuring inter-rater reliability, and 
utilizing detailed video reenactments of actual serious runway incursion incidents 
classified and recorded by the FAA in ASIAS.  ASIAS is an on-line data and information 
sharing repository consisting of 131 databases related to aviation safety and aviation 
standards (FAA, 2012e).  One of the databases is populated and maintained by the FAA 
Office of Runway with data from runway incursion incident reports that have been 
categorized for severity in accordance with the RISC model. 
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SURF-IA Model Development 
SURF-IA flight deck technology for runway incursion alerting was developed in 
response to NTSB safety recommendations starting in 1973, and reinforced by the NTSB 
in 1990 when the hazard of airport runway incursions was first placed on its list of Most 
Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements (NTSB, 2012).  Runway incursions have 
remained on the list every year since, culminating in the specific NTSB recommendation 
to install flight deck technology for runway incursion alerting leading to the development 
of SURF-IA as one of the NextGen ADS-B(In) applications. 
 
Require that all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91K, 121, and 135 operators 
install on their aircraft cockpit moving map displays or an automatic system that 
alerts pilots when a takeoff is attempted on a taxiway or a runway other than the 
one intended. (NTSB, 2007, p. 94) 
 
SURF-IA for runway incursion alerting on the flight deck required the maturation of the 
Global Positioning System (GPS) as an enabling component to provide precise position 
and timing information; hence, research in this area is some of the most recent (Young & 
Jones, 2001).  The literature review in this area focused on the development of the model 
for SURF-IA alerting and not for SURF-IA indications. 
 The concept for Enhanced Traffic Situational Awareness on the Airport Surface 
with Indications and Alerts (SURF-IA) was defined by RTCA Special Committee (SC-
186) Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) in support of the FAA 
implementation of ADS-B technologies to mitigate runway incursions (RTCA, 2010).  
The alerting model for SURF-IA was adapted by SC-186 through analysis conducted 
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under government contract by the MITRE Corporation.  The SURF-IA model was based 
on the Runway Safety Monitor (RSM) algorithm initially developed as part of the NASA 
Runway Incursion Prevention System (RIPS) research.  The genesis of the SURF-IA 
model stemmed from NTSB recommendations for the FAA to implement flight deck 
technology that provided immediate warnings of probable runway incursions directly to 
the flight-crew (Moertl & Nickum, 2008; P. Moertl, personal communication, October 8, 
2012; NTSB, 2000, 2007).  A runway incursion alert, as defined by RSM, was not 
necessarily a warning of an impending collision but rather a means of notifying the pilot 
that a hazardous situation on the runway was detected so that evasive action could be 
taken to avoid an accident (Green, 2002). 
 NASA RIPS encompassed three different technologies under the Airport Traffic 
Collision Avoidance Monitor (ATCAM):  (a) Taxi Conflict Monitor (TCM) for ground 
taxi conflicts anywhere in the airport movement and ramp areas; (b) Low Altitude 
Conflict Monitor (LACM) for air-to-air conflicts; and (c) Runway Safety Monitor (RSM) 
for runway incursion conflicts (Green, Otero, Barker, & Jones, 2009).  The first RSM 
flight demonstrations were conducted at Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport (DFW) 
alongside two other candidate runway incursion alerting models:  Runway Incursion 
Advisory and Alerting Systems (RIAAS), and Ground-Based Alerting (GBA) system.  
All three models considered the operational state of ownship and traffic determined by 
the location relative to the runway, speed, track angle, and acceleration.  The primary 
difference between the RSM model and the other candidate models, which were 
subsequently dismissed, was that RSM detection of incursions considered other criteria 
such as aircraft position within a three-dimensional virtual protection zone around a 
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runway that was being used by the ownship, along with separation, and closure rate 
between ownship and conflicting traffic.  The other considerations incorporated into the 
algorithms for RIAAS and GBA were unique criteria associated with specific scenarios 
(Young & Jones, 2001).  In the initial demonstration flights at Dallas-Fort Worth 
International Airport (DFW) the RSM algorithm alert generation rate was 91%, yielding 
four missed alerts and four false alerts, with all flight profiles following generic scenarios 
(Jones, Quach, & Young, 2001).  Generic scenarios were a subsumed amalgamation of 
many different runway incursion incidents; hence, they could not be directly mapped to a 
specific actual runway incursion incident recorded in ASIAS. 
 The DFW test only involved single runway incursion scenarios.  Consequently, 
the RSM model was enhanced to accommodate crossing runways and intersecting flight 
paths, and adjusted to reduce the number of false and missed alerts (Cassell, Evers, 
Esche, & Sleep, 2002).  In March 2002, a full mission simulation at NASA Langley 
Research Center evaluated the enhanced and improved RSM incursion detection 
algorithm and associated alerting concepts, while once again only used flight profiles 
with generic scenarios (Jones, 2002).  In 2004 the revised RSM model was flight tested at 
Wallops Flight Facility (WAL) alongside a runway incursion decision algorithm called 
PathProx, which like RIAS and GBA used a scenario based alerting scheme (Jones, 
2004).  The RSM algorithm alert generation rate was 100% with no missed or false 
alerts, while the scenario-based PathProx only alerted 41% of the time when an alert was 
expected (Jones, 2004).  The research concluded that the RSM model would significantly 
enhance runway safety, but should be validated with further simulations and flight 
demonstrations. 
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 Following the Wallops flight demonstration, another simulation study by Prinzel 
and Jones (2006) tested the RSM utilizing runway incursion scenarios developed by 
NASA, which were then categorized by the RISC model as Category A, B, C, or D 
through an independent analysis by three raters from the FAA Office of Runway Safety. 
 Flight demonstrations of the SURF-IA alerting model based on the improved 
RSM model were flown in 2009 by Aviation Communication and Surveillance Systems 
(ACSS) under contract with the FAA at Philadelphia International Airport (PHL), and 
evaluated for technical feasibility and safety effectiveness using six generic alerting 
scenarios (ACSS, 2010).  This was followed by an additional demonstration flown with 
generic scenario profiles by Honeywell in 2010 at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport 
(SEA), also under FAA contract, to refine and mature the model prior to incorporation 
into the Safety, Performance, and Interoperability Requirements (SPR) document for 
SURF-IA (Honeywell, 2010; RTCA 2010). 
 The literature review indicated that previous research, simulations, and 
demonstrations of SURF-IA had all followed the accepted practice of benchmarking 
performance of conflict alerting algorithms using generic conflict scenario profiles, and 
not data from specific actual runway incursion incidents (Latimer, 2012).  Latimer’s 
(2012) research on creating a conceptual detection and avoidance model recognized the 
value of using actual incidents to examine outcomes of conflict alerting models and even 
presented a mix of generic scenarios and actual incidents; however, the study ultimately 
only utilized the generic scenarios.  An analysis by Moertl, Lascara, Higgins, and Baker 
(2012, June) to estimate the safety benefits of SURF-IA based on the minimum RTCA 
(2010) SURF-IA requirement utilized data from a set of 24 historical Category A and 
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Category B runway incursions from FY 2007 of which 12 were PD type.  The runway 
incursions were reconstructed from limited available information, and required detailed 
assumptions about aircraft movement and timing based on aircraft typical performance 
characteristics, such as aircraft velocity and distance travelled down the runway during 
take-off/landing, and aircraft speed and altitude during an approach to a landing.  The 
study considered both indications and alerts, and used three raters who assessed the 
effect of SURF-IA on reducing the severity of runway incursion incidents (i.e., Category 
A to Category B or Category B to Category C); however, no measures of inter-rater 
reliability were presented and the study utilized the FAA definition of runway incursion 
prior to it being harmonized with ICAO in 2008.  Moertl et al. (2012, June) concluded 
that only 33% of the pilot deviation type incidents would have provided either a SURF-
IA alert or indication.  Lascara and Moertl (2012) subsequently developed a software 
tool called the Surface Surveillance Analysis Platform (SSAP) to determine, verify, and 
validate SURF-IA outputs from historic runway incursions; however, SSAP used outputs 
different than required by minimally compliant RTCA (2010) SURF-IA technology.  
Only four runway incursion scenarios were analyzed of which only two were from actual 
incidents: one operational error (O/E) and one pilot deviation (PD).  Both incidents were 
classified as Category C runway incursions and one triggered a SURF-IA alert.  The 
most recent SURF-IA study by Jones et al. (2012) evaluated the SURF-IA algorithm at 
various levels of horizontal position accuracy for seven runway incursion scenarios and 
did not focus on alerts or PD type incidents.  Although some of the analyses used in the 
development of SURF-IA utilized expert raters, none reported any measure of inter-rater 
reliability. 
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Expert Raters and Inter-rater Reliability 
There was abundant literature addressing inter-rater reliability with seminal work 
by Cohen (1960) and Fleiss (1971), which had been used extensively in a variety of 
studies where models were rated by experts.  The relevant statistical literature for this 
study revolved around the precedent for rating categorical data with two raters and 
measuring inter-rater reliability using percentage agreement and Cohen’s kappa. 
The use of expert raters and measures of inter-rater reliability to validate models 
has been used extensively in research, primarily in medicine and social science.  
However, there was no de facto requisite number of expert raters, which have ranged 
from a minimum of two up to dozens of raters.  There was general agreement in the 
literature that the various indices of inter-rater reliability each have advantages and 
disadvantages; hence, at least two indices should be used to measure inter-rater 
consistency.  The terms of inter-rater consistency, inter-rater agreement, inter-observer 
reliability, inter-judge reliability, and inter-rater reliability have been used 
interchangeably in the literature and were considered synonymous for this study. 
Based on a review of the relevant literature, it was concluded that percentage 
agreement is the simplest measure of inter-rater reliability; however, it does not take into 
account the agreement that would be expected by chance alone.  Consequently, 
percentage agreement is normally augmented by one or more complex measures that 
indicate the proportion of agreement beyond that expected by chance, such as Cohen’s 
kappa, Cohen’s weighted kappa, or Fleiss kappa, depending on the number of raters and 
whether the variables are nominal, ordinal, or continuous.  Fleiss’ kappa is a variant of 
Cohen’s kappa that works for any constant number of raters assigning categorical ratings 
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to a fixed number of items.  The simplest use of Cohen’s kappa is where two raters 
provided an independent single dichotomous nominal rating for each case, while a 
weighted Cohen’s kappa is appropriate for ordinal and continuous ratings to assess the 
level of disagreement by attaching greater emphasis to large differences between ratings 
than small differences (Sim & Wright, 2005).  Kappa (k) indicates the proportion of 
agreement beyond what is expected by chance and takes the form of the following 
equation: 
 
𝐾 =  ( 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 − 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)1 − 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  
 
The data for a 2-category (dichotomous) nominal scale are usually displayed on a 2 x 2 
contingency table, as presented in Table 5 (Gwet, 2001). 
 
Table 5  
Contingency table for runway incursion alerting  
 
 Rater 1  
Total Alert No Alert 
Rater 2 Alert a b     g1 = a + b 
    g2 = c + d No Alert c d 
                                  Total f1 = a + c f2 = b + d    N = f1 + f2 
Note: Adapted from “The kappa statistic in reliability studies: Use, interpretation, and 
sample size requirements,” by J. Sim, and C.C. Wright, 2005, Journal of the American 
Physical Therapy Association, 85(3), 257-268. 
 
 
 
 Sim and Wright (2005) recommended the following method to determine kappa.  
The frequency of observed agreement is obtained by summing the frequencies of the 
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main diagonal cells (a + d).  The proportion of observed agreement (Po) is obtained by 
dividing the frequency by the total number of ratings (n).  The frequency of chance 
agreement for alerting and non-alerting ratings is calculated by multiplying the marginal 
totals corresponding to each cell on the main diagonal and dividing by n.  The proportion 
of expected agreement (Pc) is obtained by summing across chance agreement in these 
cells and dividing by n.  The values of Pc and Po are used to determine k as shown in the 
following equations (Cohen, 1960; Sim & Wright, 2005): 
 
Po = (a + d)/n 
Pc =[ (𝑓1 𝑥 𝑔1)𝑛 + (𝑓2 𝑥 𝑔2)𝑛 ] / n 
𝑘 = (𝑃𝑜 − 𝑃𝑐)1 − 𝑃𝑐  
 
The range of possible values of kappa is from -1.0 to +1.0, where the latter indicates 
perfect agreement by the raters in every case.  Zero indicates agreement no better than by 
chance, and negative values indicates agreement worse than expected by chance.  Green 
(1997) suggested that kappas greater than .75 were considered to have a high agreement 
beyond chance, values below .40 have a low agreement, and values between .40 and .75 
represented a fair to good level of agreement beyond chance alone.  Landis and Koch 
(1977) had a somewhat more refined scale for standards of strength of agreement for the 
kappa coefficient, which appeared to be the most widely accepted in the literature 
reviewed for this study (Table 6).  The minimally acceptable value of kappa depends on 
the context (Laura & William, 1999).  Medical studies have defined clinically important 
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kappa values ranging from less than .50 to greater than .80 depending on the level of 
medical risk, while academic textbooks and statisticians generally recommend a kappa 
value of .60 or greater.  Some studies have recognized any kappa value above zero, better 
than by chance, as minimally acceptable.  Overall, the preponderance of authors have 
acknowledged that kappa tends to be lower than other measures of inter-rater agreement 
since it corrects for chance, and that the kappa divisions for strength of agreement are 
arbitrary (Landis & Koch, 1977; Leech, Barret, & Morgan, 2008).  This study followed 
the guidance from Sim and Wright (2005) for a small sample size of nine cases in a 2-
rater study, which required a kappa of .90 to be statistically significant (p < .05) for the 
dichotomous variable of alerting or non-alerting.  The high kappa value of .90 was 
consistent with other research involving elevated risk and was considered appropriate 
within the context of this study (Laura & William, 1999). 
 
 
Table 6 
 
Generally accepted standards of agreement for kappa    
 
Kappa Statistic Strength of Agreement 
< 0.0 Poor 
0.0-0.20 Slight 
0.21-0.40 Fair 
0.41-0.60 Moderate 
0.61-0.80 Substantial 
0.81-1.00 Almost Perfect 
Note: Adapted from “The measurement of observer agreement for categorical data coefficient of agreement 
for nominal scale,” by J. Landis, and G. Koch, 1977, Biometrics(33)1, 159-174. 
 
 
 
 The kappa statistic alone is appropriate if the marginal totals for the 2 x 2 
contingency table are relatively balanced.  However, if a statistical computer program 
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such as SPSS is used to calculate kappa when the prevalence of a given response is very 
high, the value of kappa may indicate a low level of reliability even when the observed 
proportion of agreement is quite high (Cunningham, 2009; Sim & Wright, 2005).  For 
example, the proportion of observed agreement in Table 7 was 95%; however, the SPSS 
calculated kappa was -0.0163, indicating poor agreement according to the Landis and 
Koch (1977) generally accepted standards of agreement. 
 
 
Table 7 
Prevalence and bias paradox   
 
Rater A * Rater B Cross-tabulation 
 
Rater B 
Total No Alert Alert 
Rater 
A 
No 
Alert 
Count 95 4 99 
% of Total 95% 4% 99% 
Alert Count 1 0 1 
% of Total 1% 0% 1% 
Total Count 96 4 100 
% of Total 96% 4% 100.0% 
Note: Adapted from “More than Just the Kappa Coefficient: A Program to Fully Characterize Inter-Rater 
Reliability between Two Raters,” by M. Cunningham, 2009, SAS Global Forum,242. 
 
 
 
 Prevalence is the proportion of agreement on ratings of the attribute, sometimes 
called symmetry of agreement.  A high prevalence index (PI) indicates a high chance 
agreement and leads to reduced kappa values, and vice versa.  Bias index (BI) is the 
extent to which the raters disagree on the proportion of ratings.  When there is a large 
bias, kappa is higher than when bias is low or absent.  Prevalence index and bias index 
have been used to interpret and inform the magnitude of kappa using the following 
formulas (Sim & Wright, 2005): 
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Prevalence Index = |𝑎 − 𝑑|/𝑛 
 
Bias Index = |𝑏 − 𝑐|/𝑛 
 
In the example from Table 7, the calculated PI of .95 and the BI of .03 accounted for the 
misleading low kappa (-.0163), even though there was a 95% observed agreement 
(Cunningham, 2009).  
Some authors have suggested computing a kappa adjusted for prevalence and bias 
(Byrt, Bishop, & Carlin, 1993; Cunningham, 2009; Sim & Wright, 2005).  Prevalence is 
taken into account by computing the average value of cell a and cell d in Table 5 and 
substituting that value into the actual value of those cells.  Bias is accommodated by 
substituting the average of cells b and c for those actual cell values.  The resulting kappa 
coefficient is referred to as prevalence-adjusted bias-adjusted kappa (PABAK). 
 The use of two raters providing nominal ratings and measuring agreement with 
the kappa statistic has been previously used in a variety of peer reviewed research and 
doctoral dissertations.  Kilpikoski et al. (2002) conducted a study where two clinicians 
rated low back pain for 39 patients using a dichotomous rating scale.  Sim and Wright 
(2005) cited another related study in a book by McKenzie (1981) that provided data for 
the agreement of two raters for categorical classification of spinal pain.  Wrisley (1998) 
utilized two raters and kappa statistics to assess the inter-rater reliability for rating the 
performance of 30 human subjects completing walking tasks on level surfaces and 
climbing stairs.  An example of an aviation related study that relied on two raters was a 
NASA analysis of airspace violations that categorized the apparent factors and causes 
into eight dimensions.  The study involved 22 records, which were coded independently 
by two raters with only percentage agreement used as a measure of inter-rater reliability 
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(Zuschlag, 2005).  Another aviation related study utilized two radiologists who 
independently rated spine x-rays of F-16 pilots to classify spinal degeneration, with inter-
rater reliability assessed by percentage agreement and Cohen’s kappa (Hendriksen & 
Holewijn, 1999). 
 A multitude of doctoral dissertations have used two raters and inter-rater 
reliability measures of percentage agreement and kappa.  A university research study by 
Mata (1993) assessing the value of chest x-rays as a screening tool for the diagnosis of 
skeletal disorders used two physicians as raters with inter-rater reliability measured by 
percentage agreement and kappa.  D’Amato (2008) rated a sample of 218 dreams of adult 
adopted women using two raters, and more recently Arany (2012) used two raters in a 
dissertation involving the coding of family mediation agreements. 
 Sim and Wright (2005) suggested:  (a) constructing a confidence interval around 
the kappa value obtained using the standard error (SE) of kappa (k) and the z score 
corresponding to the desired level of confidence to reflect sampling error; and (b) testing 
the significance of kappa against a value that represents a minimum acceptable level of 
agreement, rather than against zero, thereby testing whether its plausible values lie above 
an acceptable threshold.  Sim and Wright (2005) also presented a table with the number 
of subjects (incidents) required in a 2-rater study to detect a statistically significant kappa 
for p ≤ .05 on a dichotomous variable (Table C1). 
 Notably, Shoukri (2004) asserted that when seeking to detect a kappa ≥ 0.40 on a 
dichotomous variable, using more than three raters had little effect on the power of 
hypothesis testing or the width of the confidence intervals, and suggested that increasing 
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the number of subjects (incidents) was the more effective strategy for maximizing 
statistical power.  
Metric Validity 
Decisions to fund and support new technology in any field (e.g., aviation, 
medical, information technology) have hinged on the demonstration of a benefit as 
measured by applicable valid metrics (Laupacis, Feeny, Detsky, & Tugwell, 1992).  
However, the rapidity in which new technology has developed often results in the 
technology outpacing the validity of the metrics used to measure its effectiveness 
(Bughin, Shenkan, & Singer, 2009). 
The legacy/traditional metrics recorded in ASIAS, such as those for runway 
incursions and near mid-air collisions, can be considered operational metrics that can be 
used to determine the continued funding and support of new technology after initial 
operational introduction into the NAS.  However, when new technology is in its infancy 
and still in the research and developmental phase, the validity is determined by 
engineering metrics, which can also be outdated, invalid, or otherwise not harmonized 
with the new technology.  Numerous legacy/traditional rating scales have been used as 
engineering metrics during the certification of new aircraft technology.  One of the most 
recognizable is the Handling Qualities Rating (HQR) Scale depicted in Figure 8, which 
was first developed in 1966 by Harper and Cooper (1966, 1986).  Handling qualities are 
those qualities or characteristics of an aircraft that govern the ease and precision with 
which a pilot is able to perform a specified task (Cooper & Harper, 1969).  The HQR 
scale, commonly called the Cooper-Harper scale, is a decision tree that considers task 
performance and workload in determining the rating.  Task performance is quantitative 
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and readily measured as either adequate or desired, for example: (a) maintained runway 
centerline within ± 3 feet (adequate); or (b) maintained runway centerline within ± 1 feet 
(desired).  Workload is subjective and qualitatively assessed on a continuum for pilot 
compensation ranging from minimal to intense. 
 
 
Figure 8.  Cooper-Harper handling qualities rating scale.  Adapted from “The use of pilot 
rating in the evaluation of aircraft handling qualities,” by G.E. Cooper and R. P. Harper, 
1969, NASA TN D-153. 
 
 
 
The Cooper-Harper definition of pilot workload recognized mental workload to 
some extent, but acknowledged that it could not be directly quantified.  When developing 
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the handling qualities rating scale and initially validating the pilot ratings for workload, 
Harper and Cooper (1966) used pilot heart rates, and/or frequency and magnitude of 
control inputs as proxies for workload.  Hence, the scale focused primarily on the 
physical effort expended by the pilot in moving or imposing forces on the mechanical 
flight controls during a specified task. 
The HQR scale is still in use today for rating aircraft handling qualities, even 
though aircraft have evolved from manually operated mechanical flight and engine 
controls to fly-by-wire systems with fully automated digital engine controls and 
autopilots (Cooper & Harper, 1969; Harper & Cooper, 1986).  The consensus in the 
literature is that workload is comprised of multiple factors, to include but not limited to 
physical, mental, psychological, and environmental.  New technology in modern aircraft 
has transformed the primary role of the pilot from a direct manipulator of flight controls, 
to a systems operator where mental workload far exceeds physical demands from moving 
or imposing forces on mechanical flight controls.  Hence, the prevalence and influence of 
these workload factors in modern aircraft has shifted away from the physical workload of 
physical force inputs to mechanical flight controls, demanding changes to the engineering 
metrics. 
The Royal Aerospace Establishment, NASA, and others recognized the 
shortcomings in the Cooper-Harper workload assessment and developed modified and 
new scales, such as the Bedford rating scale, Subjective Workload Assessment Technique 
(SWAT), and the NASA Task Load Index (TLI) (Hart & Staveland, 1988; Reid & 
Nygren, 1988; Roscoe & Ellis, 1990). 
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For example, the Bedford scale focused exclusively on pilot workload, measured 
by the pilot’s excess capacity to perform other tasks, while the NASA TLX model 
considered six factors; mental, physical, temporal demand, performance, effort, and 
frustration (Hart & Staveland, 1988; Roscoe & Ellis, 1990).  Although there have been 
modifications to the workload rating metrics, there has not been a consistent process for 
determining when new technology requires modifications to legacy metrics, and what 
modifications are necessary to ensure the legacy metrics are valid for the new technology. 
The application of this methodology is also evident in non-aviation fields such as 
Internet applications where Russell (2009) suggested that “new metrics are needed, in 
part because the legacy metrics are outdated but also because the digital world is evolving 
at an accelerated speed”.  Although Russell (2009), Bughin et al. (2008), and others have 
recognized the increasing obsolescence of legacy or traditional metrics in non-aviation 
fields, no one has presented a methodology for evaluating and modifying legacy or 
traditional metrics for application to new technology in any field. 
 
Summary 
As SURF-IA technology is installed in aircraft, the FAA will determine the 
effectiveness and benefits based on the change in the actual number and rate of pilot 
deviation type runway incursion incidents using the existing FAA data gathering and 
reporting process for runway safety statistics, which is based on the RISC model.  Hence, 
the SURF-IA model should be validated using profiles from specific actual incidents that 
have been categorized by the RISC model and recorded in the FAA ASIAS database, as 
was performed in this study, instead of a set of generic scenarios as has been previously 
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accomplished.  This study improved on shortcomings in previous research by using RISC 
model outcomes from specific runway incursion incidents recorded by the FAA in 
ASIAS to examine the outcomes from the SURF-IA alerting model.  The literature 
review also indicated precedents in research and academia for utilizing two raters and 
measuring inter-rater reliability by percentage agreement and Cohen’s Kappa. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
 Video reenactments of runway incursion incidents and the associated ASIAS 
incident report data were reviewed by two expert raters.  Although the raters may have 
been familiar with the types of incidents investigated in this study, the focus of the ratings 
was on evaluating the SURF-IA alerting outcomes.  Thus, any prior familiarity with the 
incidents was not expected to influence their ratings of the SURF-IA technology.  The 
raters applied the baseline minimally compliant implementation of the RTCA/DO-323 
SURF-IA model to determine which incidents would have triggered a SURF-IA Warning 
or Caution alert.  A minimum acceptable PABAK of ≥ 0.90 was used for this study.  The 
runway incursion incidents were rated on a dichotomous scale that classified the incidents 
as either SURF-IA alerting or SURF-IA non-alerting.  This research approach of using 
expert raters to validate legacy metrics for application to new technology is generalizable 
to other fields of study. 
Research Approach 
The analysis focused on whether runway incursion incidents classified with an 
outcome as serious (Category A or B) using the RISC model would trigger a SURF-IA 
model outcome to display an alert (Warning or Caution) to the pilot.  
The video reenactments and ASIAS runway incursion report narratives were 
viewed by two expert raters who were the actual developers of the aircraft states and 
alerting outcomes for the SURF-IA model, as defined in Table 8.  Both raters are 
internationally recognized SURF-IA subject matter experts and have been referenced 
extensively in the literature as well as the citations for this study.  To avoid any real or 
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perceived bias, the raters were selected from non-regulatory government agencies and 
independent government contractors, rather than from the FAA, which regulates/reports 
runway incursions and certifies new technology; the avionics industry, which profits from 
the certification of new technology, or; the airline industry, which is subject to pilot 
deviation reports from runway incursions.  The minimum requirements for the SURF-IA 
alerting model were applied to each incident using the logic adapted from RTCA/DO-323 
and the definitions from Table 8 (RTCA, 2010). 
 
 
Table 8 
Definition of aircraft states  
 
Aircraft State Explanation of Aircraft State 
Entering/Crossing 
Runway (not lined-up) 
Heading > 20º difference from runway heading 
Take-off  From detection of take-off  roll to lift-off 
Approach to runway Straight path segment toward a runway, 1000 ft. AFE and  ≤  
3  nm from  RTHRE 
After Landing Roll-out 
on-runway 
≥ 40 knots 
Stopped or Taxiing along 
runway (lined-up) 
Heading < 20º difference from runway heading and < 40 
knots 
Note: Adapted from “Safety, Performance and Interoperability Requirements Document for Enhanced 
Traffic Situational Awareness on the Airport Surface with Indications and Alerts (SURF-IA)” by Radio 
Technical Commission for Aeronautics [RTCA/DO-323], 2010. 
 
 
 
In addition to the SURF-IA model limitations mentioned in Chapter II, the model 
follows the logic diagram in Figure 9.  Commencing from the “Start” arrow in Figure 8 
and moving vertically down, the first two blocks represent SURF-IA design limitations 
where the logic path leads to the no alert conditions for: (a) wrong runway departure; and 
(b) less than 40 knots closure between ownship and traffic.  The next block vertically 
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down addresses whether or not one of the aircraft is airborne.  No SURF-IA alert will be 
issued if the airborne traffic is above 1000 feet above field elevation (AFE), more than 3 
nm from the runway threshold (RTHRE), or more than 35 seconds from the runway 
threshold. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. SURF-IA alerting logic.  Adapted from “Safety, Performance and 
Interoperability Requirements Document for Enhanced Traffic Situational Awareness on 
the Airport Surface with Indications and Alerts (SURF-IA),” by Radio Technical 
Commission for Aeronautics [RTCA/DO-323], 2010. 
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The SURF-IA model specifies a symmetric 4 x 4 matrix of ownship/traffic 
aircraft states for runway incursions involving intersecting runways (Figure 10).  The 
four possible aircraft states are:  (a) on approach and within 35 seconds of runway 
threshold; (b) on approach and within 15 seconds of runway threshold; (c) landing; and 
(d) taking off.  All paired aircraft states are designed to provide an alerting outcome, 
except for two conditions: ownship will not have a SURF-IA alerting outcome during 
landing or take-off if the traffic aircraft on approach, and within 35 seconds of the 
runway, is trailing behind ownship as shown in blocks C1 and D1 of Figure 10.  
However, ownship will provide an alert once the trailing traffic on approach is within 15 
seconds of the runway threshold, as shown in blocks C2 and D2 of Figure 10. 
 
 
 OWNSHIP STATE  
 A B C D 
TR
A
FF
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  S
TA
TE
 
 ON 
APPROACH 
AND WITHIN 
35 SECS OF 
RUNWAY 
THRESHOLD 
ON APPROACH 
AND WITHIN 
15 SECS OF 
RUNWAY 
THRESHOLD 
LANDING TAKING 
OFF 
ON APPROACH 
AND WITHIN 35 
SECS OF RUNWAY 
THRESHOLD 
ALERT (A1) ALERT (B1) NO ALERT 
(C1) 
NO ALERT 
(D1) 
1 
ON APPROACH 
AND WITHIN 15 
SECS OF RUNWAY 
THRESHOLD 
ALERT (A2) ALERT (B2) ALERT (C2) ALERT 
(D2) 
2 
LANDING ALERT (A3) ALERT (B3) ALERT (C3) ALERT 
(D3) 
3 
TAKING OFF ALERT (A4) ALERT (B4) ALERT (C4) ALERT 
(D4) 
4 
 
Figure 10.  SURF-IA alerts for intersecting runways.  Adapted from “Safety, 
Performance and Interoperability Requirements Document for Enhanced Traffic 
Situational Awareness on the Airport Surface with Indications and Alerts (SURF-IA),” 
by Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA/DO-323). 
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For all other possible two-aircraft states involving intersecting or same runway 
scenarios, the SURF-IA model specifies a 5 x 8 matrix of ownship/traffic states.  Five 
aircraft states are common to ownship and traffic:  (a) entering-crossing runway (not 
lined up), (b) take-off, (c) approach to runway (≤ 3 nm from runway), (d) alert landing 
roll-out on runway, and (e) stopped or taxiing along runway (lined up).  Three exclusive 
aircraft states for traffic are identified for intersecting runways:  (a) approach to 
intersecting runway (≤ 3nm from runway), (b) landing rollout intersecting runway, and 
(c) take-off on intersecting runway.  All of the 25 paired states not involving intersecting 
runways are designed to provide a SURF-IA alert, with the following four aircraft state 
pairs as exceptions (Figure 11):  (a) ownship and traffic simultaneously entering or 
crossing the same runway (not lined-up), as shown in block E1; (b) one aircraft entering 
or crossing the runway (not lined up) and the other aircraft stopped or taxiing on the same 
runway (lined up), as shown in block, I1, and E12; (c) ownship and traffic simultaneously 
stopped or taxiing on same runway (not lined-up), as shown in block I12.  All of the 15 
paired states involving intersecting runways are designed to provide a SURF-IA alert, 
except for six aircraft state pairs where ownship is either stopped/taxiing along a runway 
(not lined up), or entering-crossing a runway (not lined up) with the traffic aircraft on 
approach, landing rollout, or taking off from an intersecting runway, as shown in blocks 
E14, E16, E18, I14, I16, and I18 of Figure 11.
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Figure 11.  SURF-IA alerts for all possible two-aircraft state combinations.  Adapted from “Safety, Performance and 
Interoperability Requirements Document for Enhanced Traffic Situational Awareness on the Airport Surface with Indications 
and Alerts (SURF-IA),” by Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics [RTCA/DO-323].
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Each incident was dichotomously categorically coded whether or not the incident 
would have triggered an alert (Warning or Caution) in accordance with the RTCA (2010) 
SURF-IA model.  This study did not evaluate the physical location of the SURF-IA 
annunciation on the CDTI in the pilot’s field-of-view, navigational positional accuracy, 
or aircraft deceleration/braking performance.  Hence, the raters only rated whether or not 
a SURF-IA alert would have been triggered, without considering whether or not a 
runway incursion would have been avoided. 
 
Pilot Study.  A pilot study (i.e., feasibility study) was conducted to establish the 
validity of the instrument and the inter-rater reliability of the raters.  The sample for the 
pilot study consisted of FAA video reenactments and ASIAS reports from nine serious 
runway incursion incidents, which was the minimum required sample size to determine 
inter-rater reliability according to the Sim and Wright (2005) guidance.  The population 
of serious runway incursions incidents, for which video reenactments were developed by 
the FAA Office of Runway Safety, consisted of 58 incidents; however, only nine were 
PD type.  Consequently, the pilot study utilized Operational Error/Deviation/ Incident 
(OE/D/I) type incidents and not any of the PD type incidents, which were reserved for the 
main study.  The SURF-IA software alerting algorithm made no distinction between 
aircraft alerting states caused by the actions of a pilot or ATC; hence, OE/D/I incidents 
used in the pilot study were considered surrogates for PD type incidents.  The pilot study 
incidents were validated against a true score, which was expected to be a SURF-IA alert 
for all nine incidents based on the outcomes from similar scenarios that alerted during the 
ACSS (2010) and Honeywell (2010) SURF-IA flight demonstrations. 
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The data from the two raters in the pilot study were consolidated to show a side-
by-side comparison, and then used to develop a 2 x 2 contingency table with descriptive 
statistics.  The pilot study was used to:  (a) check that the instructions given to the raters 
in Appendix E were comprehensible; (b) verify the raters were skilled in viewing the 
video reenactments and associated narratives; (c) ensure the document and video files on 
the media storage device provided to the raters were readable; and (d) evaluate the forms, 
procedures, and data analysis approach to identify any necessary modifications.  The 
same raters were used in the pilot study and the main study, as suggested by Thabane et 
al. (2010), and van Teijlingen and Hundley (2001).  A Human Subjects Protocol 
application was submitted to the ERAU Institutional Review Board (IRB) which granted 
the study an exemption for both the pilot study and the main study since the research used 
existing data and posed no risks to the raters (Appendix A).  Pilot studies are often used 
to estimate the sample size required for a main study to be statistically significant 
(Thabane et al., 2010).  However, this study established a sample size of nine cases for 
the main study a priori based on the Sim and Wright (2005) guidance.  Although pilot 
study sample sizes are typically smaller than those for a main study, matching sample 
sizes were used to provide the raters familiarity and training with the rater instructions, 
instruments, and data collection devices (Hertzog, 2008; Thabane et al., 2010).  Both 
raters had previously utilized and cited ASIAS reports and the SURF-IA alerting logic in 
their own research (Jones et al., 2012; Moertl et al., 2012), hence no additional training 
beyond the pilot study was deemed necessary.  The identical sample sizes also provided 
some insight for the time that would be required for the raters to complete the main study.  
The raters were mailed a media storage device with document and video files as listed in 
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Appendix E.  The raters were then allowed to rate the nine runway incursion incidents at 
a time and place of their convenience, under the condition that they abide by the 
provisions of their signed Informed Consent Form (Appendix A), which required an 
independent assessment to be completed within four weeks using no other materials.  
Both raters reported that they required approximately four hours to rate all nine incidents, 
and both returned the data collection sheet (Appendix F) via email within two weeks of 
receipt of the rater data package.  The data from the pilot study were not merged with the 
main study due to modifications that were incorporated into the procedures as a result of 
the pilot study.  Furthermore, the data for the pilot study consisted of OE/D/I type 
incidents that constituted a different sampling frame from the PD type incidents used in 
the main study.  The pilot study was analyzed to ensure the reason codes matched the 
rated outcomes.  For example, if a reason code of I12 was selected by the rater from 
Figure 10, it should have been recorded in the no alert block of the data collection device 
in Table B1.  In some cases the raters assigned multiple reason codes as a result of 
confusion with some of the definitions, such as when an aircraft was considered to be on-
runway or at what speed did an aircraft on the runway transition from a “taxiing” state to 
a “take-off” state.  Consequently, prior to the main study the raters where provided a 
table of definitions for all aircraft states, derived from the SURF-IA RTCA (2010) 
requirements document and presented in Table 8. 
 
Design and Procedures.  A Human Subjects Protocol Application was approved 
by the ERAU IRB, which included an Informed Consent Form for the raters (Appendix 
A).  Each rater was provided a media storage device with runway incursion reenactment 
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videos and document files with narratives from the associated ASIAS runway incursion 
reports.  The raters reviewed video reenactments of less than five minutes duration each 
and read the associated FAA runway incursion report for the incident extracted from the 
ASIAS integrated online database of safety data.  The SURF-IA alerting logic from 
RTCA/DO-323, as shown in Figures 9, 10, and 11, was then followed to determine if the 
incident would have triggered an alerting outcome (Warning or Caution) from the SURF-
IA model.  The results for each incident were recorded on a data collection device 
(Appendix B).  The following instructions were provided to the raters as part of the 
Informed Consent Form, along with the additional instructions in Appendix E: 
1. Rate 18 runway incursion incidents within four weeks of receipt of a rater 
package by mail which will include a media storage device (flash drive) with 
videos and document files, as well as paper copies of the documents.  
2. This study does not evaluate the location of the SURF-IA annunciation on the 
CDTI in the pilot’s field-of-view, navigational positional accuracy, or aircraft 
deceleration/braking performance.  Hence, the raters should only rate whether or 
not a SURF-IA alert would have been triggered, without considering whether or 
not a runway incursion would have been avoided. 
3. Not reproduce or share any of the items and will return them to this investigator 
along with a completed rater matrix.  
4. Rate the incidents independently without discussion with any other person or 
reference to any other information.  
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5. You will not be expected to travel to any location but will require a personal 
computer with word processing (.doc and .docx) and the ability to view video 
files (.swf, .exe, Adobe® Flash® Player, Internet Explorer®). 
 
 The SURF-IA logic for this study only considered alerts and did not include or 
consider SURF-IA indications.  Conflicts were defined as any movement between two 
aircraft that potentially could lead to a high speed collision on the runway surface.  The 
conflict prediction was based on the relative speed and track between the two aircraft 
unless ownship was on the surface and the conflicting traffic was airborne on approach, 
or when ownship was airborne on approach and the conflicting traffic was intruding on 
the runway.  In both of the latter cases, which involved one aircraft on the surface and 
one airborne aircraft, the alert logic was based on predicted time for the airborne aircraft 
on approach to reach the runway threshold (RTHRE).  A Caution alert was issued if the 
predicted time to conflict was less than 35 seconds.  A Warning alert was issued if the 
predicted time to conflict was less than 15 seconds (RTCA, 2010).  There was no 
difference in the expected crew response to a Warning alert or a Caution alert: the 
difference between the alerts being solely a matter of urgency (Honeywell, 2010). 
 
Apparatus and Materials.  The SURF-IA model, as depicted in Figures 9-11, 
represented the minimum recommended output specifications that SURF-IA should 
provide. (RTCA, 2010).  Reenactment videos of runway incursions along with the 
associated ASIAS narrative reports were provided to each rater.  Examples of screenshots 
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from a runway incursion video reenactment produced by the FAA Office of Runway 
Safety and an ASIAS runway incursion incident report are depicted in Appendix D. 
 
Population/Sample 
The FAA Office of Runway Safety produced reenactment videos of runway 
incursion incidents that were of high interest to the public, FAA, or the NTSB (R. 
Motzko, personal communication, July 11, 2012).  The database consisted of 58 video 
reenactments from runway incursion incidents of all types and categories that occurred 
between CY 2005-CY 2012, of which nine were PD type serious (Category A or B) 
incidents.  The sample set consisted of the entire population of serious pilot deviation 
type runway incursion incidents recorded by the FAA Office of Runway Safety in the 
ASIAS database, for which video reenactments were produced using actual surveillance 
data from the incidents (Table 9). 
 
 
Table 9 
ASIAS reports of pilot deviation type serious (Category A or B) runway incursion 
incidents  
 
  ASIAS ID   
8173 5826 4828 7167 11322 
10923 10675 10969 3374 ------- 
Note: Adapted from ASIAS database website (http://www.asias.faa.gov/) 
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An FAA (2002) analysis of 719 PD type runway incursions recorded from FY 
1997-FY 2001 indicated that 624 of the incidents (87%) were associated with an aircraft 
that entered the runway or crossed the hold short line after acknowledging hold short 
instructions, landed over aircraft in position, or landed/departed on a closed/wrong 
runway.  The FAA FY 2000-FY 2003 Runway Safety Report (2004) identified the 
following common errors in PD type runway incursion incidents: (a) pilots read back 
controller’s instructions correctly but did not comply with the instructions; (b) pilots 
failed to hold short of the runway as instructed and crossed or taxied into position on the 
runway; and (c) pilots accepted clearances issued to an aircraft other than their own.  
Cardosi, Chase, and Eon (2010) had similar findings in an analysis of 637 PD type 
runway incursions reported in FY 2008.  Another analysis by RTCA (2010) indicated that 
84% of all runway incursions and 75% of the most severe runway incursions involved an 
aircraft entering a runway ahead of an aircraft departing or landing. 
A more recent study by Joslin, Goodheart, and Tuccio (2011) analyzed 70 
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) reports and also concluded that the primary 
event leading to runway incursion incidents was aircraft entering the runway after being 
instructed to hold short. The sample set used for this present study was comprised of nine 
incidents involving the common errors reported by Joslin et al. (2011), Cardosi et al. 
(2010), and the FAA (2004), which were representative of the most pervasive types of 
incidents that would be classified by the RISC model as a serious (Category A or B) 
incident.  
A minimum sample size of eight was recommended by Sim and Wright (2005) 
for a 2-rater study to detect a statistically significant kappa (p ≤ .05) for a one-tailed test 
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with a null value of .00, kappa to detect of .90, and 80% statistical power.  The Sim and 
Wright (2005) recommendation was based on Donner and Eliasziw (1992) goodness-of-
fit Chi-square calculations for two raters with a dichotomous outcome.  The minimum 
sample size was also predicated on a proportion of positive ratings between .10 to .90, 
calculated by Sim and Wright (2005) using the notation from Table 5 as follows: 
 
Proportion of positive ratings = (f1 + g1)/2n 
 
Sources of the Data 
Two archival sources of data were used:  (a) ASIAS reports, and (b) FAA runway 
incursion video reenactments.  ASIAS data are publically available without need for 
permission and were collected and posted on the FAA website http://www.asias.faa.gov/.  
FAA runway incursion video reenactments are also periodically posted on the FAA 
Office of Runway Safety website (http://www.faa.gov/airports/ runway_safety/videos/), 
and publically available without need for permission.  The FAA video reenactments were 
developed through precise surveillance data from Airport Surface Detection Equipment, 
Model X (ASDE-X) and the Performance Data Analysis and Reporting System 
(PDARS), along with the narrative information from the ASIAS runway incursion 
reports. 
The ASDE-X data came from surface movement radar located on the ATC 
control tower, multi-lateration sensors, ADS-B sensors, terminal automation system, and 
aircraft transponders.  By fusing that data from these sources, ASDE-X determined the 
position and identification of aircraft on the airport surface as well as aircraft flying 
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within five miles of the airport.  The Performance Data Analysis and Reporting System, 
developed and maintained by the ATAC Corporation for the FAA, is a comprehensive set 
of software tools for gathering aviation performance data.  PDARS data includes all flight 
planning data, speeds, headings, and altitudes along with a dynamic measuring tool built 
into the program to monitor the separation distance between selected aircraft.  The audio 
files for the incidents were time synched with the available ASDE and/or PDARS files 
and matched with index points on the video frames.  These data from the surveillance 
tapes were tied to the audio files, which were what the graphic artists worked with to 
match the index points, taking into account aircraft gross weight, initial roll speeds, 
acceleration, and deceleration rates during the incident.  Drafts of the video were then 
sent to the observers of the incident, pilots, companies, and ATC facilities for a 
verification of the video reenactment (R. Motzko, personal communication, February 20, 
2013). 
Archival reports of actual runway incursion incidents were already classified as 
serious (Category A or B) by the FAA Office of Runway Safety by applying the legacy 
Runway Incursion Severity Classification model.  These data, posted on the FAA ASIAS 
on-line database, were extracted and matched with the entire population of video 
reenactments of PD type incidents that were produced by the FAA Office of Runway 
Safety.  Neither the FAA nor the NTSB considers the video reenactments to be part of 
any official investigation or official report. 
Event summaries and airport diagrams showing the aircraft states for each of the 
nine PD type serious (Category A or B) runway incursion incidents are provided in 
 
 
65 
 
Figures 12 through20).  The complete detailed ASIAS reports for the runway incursions, 
as extracted from the ASIAS on-line database, were provided to the raters. 
Event 1 (ASIAS ID 8173):  An airplane was instructed by ATC to hold short of 
Runway 33 on Taxiway F.  The clearance was read back correctly; however, the taxiing 
airplane did not hold short and entered Runway 33, thereby conflicting with another 
aircraft on take-off from Runway 33 (Figure 12). 
 
 
 
Figure 12.  Event 1 (ASIAS ID 8173) with CHS airport diagram.  Adapted from FAA 
website (http://www.faa.gov/airports/runway_safety/diagrams/) 
 
       Traffic 
 
Ownship 
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Event 2 (ASIAS ID 5826):  An airplane was instructed by ATC to taxi and hold 
short of Runway 7L at Taxiway N5; however, the airplane did not hold short and entered 
Runway 7L without clearance, thereby conflicting with an aircraft on take-off from the 
same runway (Figure 13). 
 
 
 
Figure 13.  Event 2 (ASIAS ID 5826) with DAB airport diagram.  Adapted from FAA 
website (http://www.faa.gov/airports/runway_safety/diagrams/) 
 
 
Event 3 (ASIAS ID 4828):  An airplane pilot was instructed by ATC to taxi from 
the ramp to Taxiway M; however, the pilot missed the left turn to Taxiway M and entered 
Runway 35L, thinking it was Taxiway M.  The aircraft then proceeded to taxi on the 
active runway without clearance.  Another airplane approximately one-half mile from the 
runway threshold on an approach to Runway 35L saw the airplane on the runway and 
executed a go-around to avoid a high speed ground collision upon landing (Figure 14). 
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Figure 14.  Event 3 (ASIAS ID 4828) with DEN airport diagram.  Adapted from FAA 
website (http://www.faa.gov/airports/runway_safety/diagrams/) 
 
 
Event 4 (ASIAS ID 7167):  An airplane, holding short of Runway 7R at Taxiway 
B9, erroneously executed the ATC instructions given to another airplane (Call Sign 922 
vs. 229), taxied onto Runway 7R without clearance, and was overflown by another 
airplane that had just lifted off from the same runway (Figure 15). 
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Figure 15.  Event 4 (ASIAS ID 7167) with DVT airport diagram.  Adapted from FAA 
website (http://www.faa.gov/airports/runway_safety/diagrams/) 
 
 
Event 5 (ASIAS ID 11322):  An airplane landed on Runway 35L that was 
occupied by another aircraft, after being instructed (twice) by ATC to execute a go-
around due to insufficient separation from a preceding airplane that was still on the 
runway performing a stop-and-go maneuver (Figure 16). 
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Figure 16.  Event 5 (ASIAS ID 11322) with GFK airport diagram.  Adapted from FAA 
website (http://www.faa.gov/airports/runway_safety/diagrams/) 
 
 
Event 6 (ASIAS ID 10923):  An airplane was instructed by ATC to taxi on 
Taxiway L and hold short of Runway 36R.  The airplane read back the clearance 
correctly but then proceeded to cross Runway 36R/18L without a clearance and was 
overflown by an airplane that was taking off from Runway 18L (Figure 17).  
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Figure 17.  Event 6 (ASIAS ID 10923) with HWO airport diagram.  Adapted from FAA 
website (http://www.faa.gov/airports/runway_safety/diagrams/) 
 
 
Event 7 (ASIAS ID 10675):  A helicopter was instructed to taxi to and hold short 
of Runway 16.  The pilot read back the hold short clearance correctly but then continued 
to air taxi across Runway 16 and overflew an airplane that had just landed on Runway 16 
(Figure 18).  
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Figure 18.  Event 7 (ASIAS ID 10675) with HPN airport diagram.  Adapted from FAA 
website (http://www.faa.gov/airports/runway_safety/diagrams/) 
 
 
Event 8 (ASIAS ID 10969):  An airplane was given taxi instructions for a take-off 
on Runway 25L with intermediate instructions to hold short of Runway 19L.  The 
airplane pilot called ATC ready for take-off, while still holding short of Runway 19L, 
which intersected with Runway 25L.  ATC issued a take-off clearance for a takeoff on 
Runway 25L; however, the airplane initiated its take-off acceleration from Runway 19L, 
which was the wrong runway (Figure 19).  
 
 
72 
 
 
Figure 19.  Event 8 (ASIAS ID 10969) with MKE airport diagram.  Adapted from FAA 
website (http://www.faa.gov/airports/runway_safety/diagrams/) 
 
 
Event 9 (ASIAS ID 3374):  An airplane was instructed by ATC to taxi to Runway 
22R via Taxiway H and turn left onto Taxiway B, which parallels Runway 22R.  
However, the airplane did not turn left onto Taxiway B as instructed, crossed Runway 
22R via taxiway hotel, and was overflown by an airplane departing on Runway 22R 
(Figure 20).  
Wrong 
Runway 
Correct 
Runway 
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Figure 20.  Event 9 (ASIAS ID 3374) with JFK airport diagram.  Adapted from FAA 
website (http://www.faa.gov/airports/runway_safety/diagrams/) 
 
 
Data Collection Device 
Rating data were collected from each rater for each incident and recorded in a 
table with two choices (alert or no alert), and incident number/name/location (Appendix 
B).  The raters determined a SURF-IA alerting or non-alerting outcome for the aircraft 
that was cited with the pilot deviation in the runway incursion incident report.  The list of 
incidents on the data collection devices were developed based on the entire population of 
PD type runway incursion incident video reenactments recorded in the FAA Office of 
Runway Safety database. 
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Instrument reliability.  The data collection form was populated based on the 
raters’ evaluation of ASIAS data and FAA Office of Runway Safety runway incursion 
video reenactments from archival data that constituted fixed data in the public record.  
The reliability of the instrument for the main study was tested in the pilot study and 
established a statistically significant (p ≤ .05) inter-rater reliability (k = 1.0) with all cases 
alerting for a 100% true score agreement corresponding to a 100% proportion of positive 
ratings. 
 
Instrument validity.  The raters populated the data collection sheet by 
application of the SURF-IA model to nine serious runway incursion incidents already 
categorized by the RISC model and archived in the ASIAS database.  The SURF-IA 
aircraft states for ownship and traffic were tabulated in SURF-IA logic diagrams with 
lettered columns and numbered rows (Figures 8, 9, and 10).  The raters utilized the video 
reenactments and ASIAS report narratives to determine the aircraft state of ownship 
(e.g., Column E- entering/crossing runway-not lined up) and traffic (e.g., Row 3- take-off 
from same runway) and then followed the row and column intersection to obtain the 
reason code for either an alerting or non-alerting outcome (e.g., convergence-reason 
code E3). 
The SURF-IA model was developed by subject matter experts from a broad range 
of aviation disciplines through the internationally recognized Radio Technical 
Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA).  The RISC model was developed by subject matter 
experts from NASA and VOLPE National Transportation Systems Center, and was 
internationally recognized and utilized by the FAA and ICAO.  The runway incursion 
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reenactment videos were developed by the FAA Office of Runway Safety using precise 
position and timing data from mature surveillance systems routinely utilized and 
recognized by the NTSB for accident and incident reconstruction.  All the instruments 
used in this study were pre-established by nationally and internationally recognized 
organizations (i.e., FAA, ICAO, RTCA) and had face validity.  The pilot study discussed 
in Chapter 3 was conducted to establish the validity of the instrument. 
 
Treatment of the Data 
Statistical analysis was performed using the IBM® Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences (SPSS®) Statistics computer software, and hand calculations where 
simplicity allowed. Kappa (k) was computed manually and with SPSS.  The manual 
computations were adjusted for prevalence and bias to provide a prevalence-adjusted 
bias-adjusted kappa to assess inter-rater reliability.  The calculation of kappa (k) for the 
proportion of agreement beyond what was expected by chance was manually computed 
from the data from the contingency table using equations (1a), (1b), and (1c).  Prevalence 
index and bias index were obtained using equations (1d) and (1e). 
 
Po = (a + d)/n = (9 + 0)/9 = 1                                               (1a) 
Pc =[ 
(𝑓1 𝑥 𝑔1)
𝑛
+ (𝑓2 𝑥 𝑔2)
𝑛
] / n=[ (9 𝑥 9)
9
+ (0 𝑥 0)
9
] / 9  = 1                (1b) 
𝑘 = (𝑃𝑜−𝑃𝑐)
1−𝑃𝑐
= (1−1)
1−1
     = 1.0            (1c) 
Prevalence Index = |𝑎 − 𝑑|/𝑛 =   = |9 − 0|/9 = 1               (1d) 
Bias Index = |𝑏 − 𝑐|/𝑛 = |0 − 0|/9   = 0                         (1e) 
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Descriptive statistics.  Counts and percentages of runway incursions with an 
outcome classified as serious by the RISC model were cross-tabulated with the rater’s 
outcome for triggering a Warning or Caution alert from the SURF-IA model.  Agreement 
between the raters was calculated for all paired ratings as an overall percentage 
agreement. 
 
Reliability testing.  Inter-rater reliability for the categorical variable of alerting 
or non-alerting was used to determine the consistency among raters by overall percentage 
agreement and then by Cohen’s kappa statistic to calculate agreement beyond that 
expected by chance, as suggested by Leech, Barrett, and Morgan (2008).  The magnitude 
of kappa was influenced by prevalence of the attribute of SURF-IA alerting for the 
runway incursion incidents as well as bias, which is the extent to which the raters 
disagree on the proportion of alerting or non-alerting cases.  To assist in interpreting 
Cohen’s kappa, a prevalence index and a bias index were computed using the formulas 
from Sim and Wright (2005), and Byrt, Bishop and Carlin (1993). 
 
Qualitative data.  The SURF-IA logic diagrams were annotated with a grid of 
ownship and traffic aircraft states that determined a specific reason code for each 
incident.  A column was provided in the data collection device for the raters to indicate 
the reason code that determined whether or not the SURF-IA model alerted.  The data 
collection device also included a column for rater free-form comments that were used to 
further explain the raters’ determination of whether or not the SURF-IA model alerted. 
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The quantitative data only identified the aircraft state (e.g., after landing, take-off, 
approach) of ownship and traffic aircraft when the outcome of the SURF-IA model was 
not validated by matching a SURF-IA alert with a corresponding serious outcome from 
the RISC model.  The qualitative comments from the free-form column on the data 
collection device were supplemented by a follow-up questionnaire (Appendix G) that was 
emailed to the raters, who typed in their responses to each question and then returned the 
completed document by email.  The follow-up questionnaire was used to:  (a) explain the 
raters’ interpretation of ownship and traffic aircraft states, as defined by the SURF-IA 
algorithm, which led to their outcome assessments of either alerting or non-alerting; (b) 
identify the factors in the model(s) that influenced the different outcomes; (c) identify 
lessons learned; (d) identify other applications that might benefit from the methodology 
of using expert raters to validate legacy metrics; and (e) provide recommendations for 
modifying one or both of the models to harmonize the outcomes, and validate the SURF-
IA model.  
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
The pilot study quantitative and qualitative results were consolidated for a side-
by-side comparison, as depicted in Appendix F, and used to develop a 2 x 2 contingency 
table with descriptive statistics.  The results from the pilot study identified modifications 
to the methodology that were incorporated into the main study.  The rater data from the 
main study were consolidated in a similar manner (Appendix F).  The descriptive 
statistics and reliability testing were in agreement in both the pilot study and the main 
study, which when analyzed in conjunction with the qualitative data, identified specific 
alerting and non-alerting aircraft states. 
 
Pilot Study 
In the pilot study there was 100% agreement between the two raters for the 
OE/D/I type serious runway incursion incidents that triggered a Warning or Caution alert 
from the SURF-IA model (Table 10).  
 
 
Table 10 
Pilot study rater cross-tabulation 
Rater A * Rater B Cross-tabulation 
 
Rater B 
Total Alert 
Rater 
A 
Alert Count 9 9 
% of Total 100.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 9 9 
% of Total 100.0% 100.0% 
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The calculation of kappa (k) for the proportion of agreement beyond what was 
expected by chance resulted in a kappa (k) of 1.0, as shown in equations 2a, 2b, and 2c, 
indicating perfect inter-rater reliability (Table 11). 
 
Po = (a + d)/n = (9 + 0)/9 = 1                                               (2a) 
Pc =[ 
(𝑓1 𝑥 𝑔1)
𝑛
+ (𝑓2 𝑥 𝑔2)
𝑛
] / n=[ (9 𝑥 9)
9
+ (0 𝑥 0)
9
] / 9  = 1                (2b) 
𝑘 = (𝑃𝑜−𝑃𝑐)
1−𝑃𝑐
= (1−1)
1−1
     = 1.0            (2c) 
 
A prevalence index of 1.0 and bias index of 0.0 informed the Kappa value, 
yielding a PABAK of 1.0 (Table 12).  The kappa value for the main study was not 
computed using SPSS due to the expected misleadingly low kappa, which would have 
resulted from the influence of the high prevalence index and low bias index 
(Cunningham, 2009). 
 
 
Table 11 
Contingency table for pilot study of runway incursion alerting 
 
 Rater A  
Total Alert No Alert 
Rater B Alert a =9 b = 0   g1 = a + b = 9 
  g2 = c + d = 0 No Alert c =0 d = 0 
                                  Total f1 = a + c  = 9 f2 = b + d = 0 N = f1 + f2 = 9 
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Table 12 
 
Prevalence and bias adjusted contingency table for pilot study. (Prevalence-adjusted 
bias-adjusted kappa (PABAK) of 1.0) 
 
 Rater A  
Total Alert No Alert 
Rater B Alert 5 0   g1 = a + b = 5 
  g2 = c + d = 4 No Alert 0 4 
                                  Total f1 = a + c  = 5 f2 = b + d = 4 N = f1 + f2 = 9 
 
 
 
Although both raters agreed that all nine incidents considered in the pilot study 
would have triggered a SURF-IA alert, the reason codes were only identical in four of the 
nine cases.  The raters’ free-form comments provided insight into the explanation behind 
the differences for the other five cases, which after analysis were determined to be 
equivalent (Table C2).  Specifically, the definition for the aircraft states for landing 
rollout versus taxing on-runway (lined-up) accounted for the different reason codes 
selected for Case 1 (F12 v. F10), and Case 3 (G13 v. G10).  The reason code differences 
(A2 v. A1) for Case 5 was attributed to the raters’ temporal assessment of the aircraft 
time to cross the runway threshold (RTHRE) during an approach; Warning alert if ≤ 15 
seconds to RTHRE, or a Caution alert if ≤ 35 seconds to RTHRE.  Although the raters 
selected different reason codes for Case 6 (C4 v. F16) and Case 9 (D4 v. F18), an 
examination of the SURF-IA logic diagrams derived from RTCA (2010) indicated that 
the aircraft state codes for intersecting runways were redundant, hence, interchangeable.  
One rater provided successive SURF-IA alerting reason codes for Cases 3, 5, and 8 as the 
incidents progressed from a Caution to a Warning alert condition or from a landing 
rollout to a taxiing on-runway (lined-up) aircraft state. 
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Based on the results of the pilot study and comments from the raters, the 
following modifications to the methodology were identified:  (a) clarification of the 
difference between a landing rollout aircraft state and a taxiing on-runway (lined-up) 
aircraft state; (b) correction of a typographical error in one of the SURF-IA logic 
diagrams; and (c) additional instructions for the raters to only provide the reason code 
that triggered the first alert.  Analysis of the pilot study results established a statistically 
significant (p ≤ .05) inter-rater reliability (k = 1.0) with 100% proportion of positive 
ratings, which validated the instrument per the Sim and Wright (2005) guidance in Figure 
C1, with all cases alerting for a 100% true score agreement.  The remainder of the results 
presented in this Chapter were from the main study. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
There was 100% agreement between the two raters for the outcomes from the 
SURF-IA model for the nine pilot deviation type runway incursion incidents categorized 
as serious (Category A or B) by the RISC model (Table 13).  Both raters agreed that six 
(66.7%) of the nine incidents would have a SURF-IA outcome of an alert, and three 
(33.3%) would not have alerted. 
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Table 13 
Rater cross-tabulation 
Rater A * Rater B Cross-tabulation 
 
Rater B 
Total No Alert Alert 
Rater 
A 
No 
Alert 
Count 3 0 3 
% of Total 33.3% .0% 33.3% 
Alert Count 0 6 6 
% of Total .0% 66.7% 66.7% 
Total Count 3 6 9 
% of Total 33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 
 
 
Reliability Testing 
The overall agreement (Po) was calculated as 1.0 by equation (3a).  The 
agreement expected by chance alone (Pc) was calculated as .55 using equation (3b).  The 
calculation of kappa (k) for the proportion of agreement beyond what was expected by 
chance was computed with SPSS, as shown in Table 14, and then manually computed 
from the data in the contingency table using equation (3c) (Table 15).  Both calculations 
resulted in a kappa of 1.0.  The calculated value of kappa can range from -1.0 to +1.0; 
however, for practical purposes only the range from 0.0 to 1.0 is of interest, where zero 
indicates no agreement beyond chance and 1.0 indicates perfect agreement.  The standard 
error (SE) and the confidence interval for the 2 x 2 contingency table were manually 
calculated using equations (3d) and (3e), as suggested by Kundel and Polansky (2003), 
and yielded a value of zero, which agreed with the SPSS calculated SE value in Table 14.  
The kappa for this study was 1.0, with a corresponding SE of zero and a confidence 
interval of zero.  A prevalence index of .33 and bias index of 0.0 were obtained using 
equations (3f) and (3g) to characterize the kappa value, yielding a prevalence-adjusted 
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bias-adjusted kappa (PABAK) of 1.0 indicating complete agreement between the raters 
(Table 16). 
 
 
Table 14 
 
Symmetric measures 
 
Value Std. Errora 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Measure of 
Agreement 
Kappa 1.000 .000 .003 
N of Valid Cases 9   
 
 
 
Table 15  
Contingency table for runway incursion alerting   
 
 Rater A  
Total Alert No Alert 
Rater B Alert a =6 b = 0   g1 = a + b = 6 
  g2 = c + d = 3 No Alert c =0 d = 3 
                                  Total f1 = a + c  = 6 f2 = b + d = 3 N = f1 + f2 = 9 
 
 
 Po = (a + d)/n = (6 + 3)/9 = 1                                          (3a) 
Pc =[ (𝑓1 𝑥 𝑔1)𝑛 + (𝑓2 𝑥 𝑔2)𝑛 ] / n=[ (6  𝑥 6)9 + (3 𝑥 3)9 ] / 9 = .55                (3b) 
𝑘 = (𝑃𝑜−𝑃𝑐)
1−𝑃𝑐
= (1−.55)
1−.55      = 1.0            (3c) 
𝑆𝐸~�𝑃𝑜(1−𝑃𝑜)
𝑛(1−𝑃𝑐)2  =    � 1(1−1)9(1− .55)2  = 0           (3d) 
CI95% = k ± 1.96 x SE = 1.0 ± 1.96 x 0 = 0                            (3e) 
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Prevalence Index = |𝑎 − 𝑑|/𝑛 = |6 − 3|/9 = .33                     (3f) 
Bias Index = |𝑏 − 𝑐|/𝑛 = |0 − 0|/9   = 0                            (3g) 
 
 
 
Table 16 
 
Prevalence and bias adjusted contingency table. (Prevalence-adjusted bias adjusted 
kappa (PABAK) of 1.0) 
 
 Rater A  
Total Alert No Alert 
Rater B Alert 5 0  g1 = a + b = 5 
 g2 = c + d = 4 No Alert 0 4 
                                  Total f1 = a + c = 5 f2 = b + d = 4 N = f1 + f2 = 9 
 
 
 
Qualitative Data 
Both raters agreed on the reason codes for all nine incidents, of which six were 
rated as providing an alerting SURF-IA outcome (Table 17).  The free-form comments 
provided insight into the explanation for the aircraft states for the three incidents that did 
not provide a SURF-IA alert outcome.  The factors that precluded a SURF-IA outcome 
of a Warning or Caution alert were:  (a) SURF-IA model did not alert for a single aircraft 
wrong runway departure; (b) SURF-IA model did not alert for helicopter runway 
incursions; and (c) SURF-IA model did not alert for ownship entering or crossing the 
runway and being overflown by another aircraft taking off on the same runway when the 
aircraft on take-off had already lifted off prior to ownship entering the runway (Table 
18).  All three of the aforementioned factors that precluded a SURF-IA outcome of a 
Warning or Caution alert would have been rated as serious by the RISC model. 
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Table 17 
Ownship/Traffic pairs from serious (Category A or B) runway incursion incidents with 
an alerting SURF-IA outcome 
 
 Ownship Aircraft State 
Entering/Crossing 
Runway (Not Lined 
up) 
Take-off  
< 80 knots 
Approach 
to Runway 
(≤ 3 nm 
from 
Runway) 
Stopped 
or 
Taxiing 
on Same 
Runway 
(Lined 
Up) 
 
 
 
 
 
Traffic 
Aircraft 
State 
Take-off from 
Same Runway 
ASIAS ID 5826 
ASIAS ID 7167 
ASIAS ID 3374 
   
Entering or 
Crossing 
Runway (Not 
Lined Up) 
 ASIAS ID 
8173 
  
Stopped or 
Taxiing on 
Same Runway 
 (Lined Up) 
  ASIAS ID 
11322 
 
Approach to 
Runway (≤ 3 
nm from 
Runway 
   ASIAS 
ID 4828 
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Table 18 
Ownship/Traffic pairs from serious (Category A or B) runway incursion incidents 
without an alerting SURF-IA outcome 
 
ASIAS 
ID 
Ownship State Traffic State Factor 
10923 Entering/Crossing 
Runway 
 (Not Lined Up) 
Take-off from same 
Runway 
Traffic lifted off prior to 
Ownship entering the 
runway 
10675 Entering/Crossing 
Runway 
 (Not Lined Up) 
After Landing Roll-
out on Runway 
Ownship was a helicopter 
10969 Take-off < 80 knots Not Applicable Single aircraft wrong 
runway departure 
 
 
 
 A common theme in the raters’ qualitative comments to the follow-up 
questionnaire shown in Appendix G was the lack of clear or harmonized definitions for 
the aircraft states used in the models for the SURF-IA technology and the legacy RISC 
metrics that were used to validate the benefit of the new technology.  The aircraft state 
definition mentioned by the raters as being most troublesome was on-runway, as 
highlighted in Case 6.  Both raters indicated that neither the legacy RISC definition of on-
runway nor the SURF-IA definition was appropriate.  Hence, in this case the raters’ 
recommendation was not to adopt either model’s definition, but rather develop an entirely 
new definition through further study.  The raters were emphatic about the criticality of 
appropriate and harmonized definitions used in the models.  Consequently, a specific step 
was included in the step-by-step methodology that was developed by this study for 
assessing the validity of legacy/traditional metrics for application to new technology, as 
presented in Chapter 5.  The raters also suggested that the methodology of using expert 
raters, as presented in this study, could be applied in the systems engineering for any new 
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technology:  (a) during the concept development stage, this could help expert raters 
define the desired performance of the system; (b) during engineering development, expert 
raters could validate the requirements; and (c) during post implementation, expert ratings 
could be used to identify shortcomings and validate the functioning of the system.  One 
of the delimitations of the study was that the raters only assessed whether or not a SURF-
IA alert would have been issued, without considering late alerts or nuisance alerts when 
assessing the effectiveness of the system.  However, both raters commented on the 
importance of considering late alerts and nuisance alerts when assessing the 
effectiveness of the system.  Specifically, one of the raters recommended further analysis 
through a longitudinal study involving both normal operations and runway incursion 
incidents at multiple airports to assess correct alerting as well as nuisance and late alerts 
associated with non-serious (Category C and Category D) runway incursion incidents 
 
To define the actual requirements for an incursion alerting system, a large-scale 
validation study with empirical surveillance data from multiple airports and over 
extended periods of time needs to be performed to determine the overall system 
performance in terms of nuisance and true alerts.  Not only runway incursion 
events should be considered but especially, normal operations where the system 
should not provide alerts.  Making design decisions based on single events or 
incidents can be misleading because while the system may be optimized for these 
events, the overall system that needs to run under a much wider set of conditions 
may be operationally unacceptable.  (Rater B, 2013) 
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This study revealed how different outcomes from the RISC and SURF-IA models 
may result in misleading information when using the reduction in runway incursion 
incidents classified as serious by the RISC model, as a metric for the benefit of SURF-IA 
technology.  Expressly, the study revealed that the SURF-IA model did not yield an 
outcome of a Warning or Caution alert for all runway incursion incidents classified as 
serious (Category A or B) by the FAA/ICAO RISC model.  There were specific aircraft 
states in the baseline SURF-IA model that precluded an outcome of a Warning or 
Caution alert for runway incursion incidents classified as serious (Category A or 
Category B) by the FAA/ICAO RISC model.  
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Discussion 
The raters were in complete agreement that six of the nine serious (Category A or 
B) PD type runway incursion incidents would have triggered a SURF-IA alert outcome 
and three incidents would not have triggered an alert, resulting in a bias index of 0 and an 
overall 100% proportion of rater agreement.  The mid-range prevalence index of .33 
characterized a balance of alerting and non-alerting ratings, indicating that the 100% 
rater agreement attained was not by chance alone, which further supported the kappa 
value of 1.0 for perfect inter-rater reliability.  The kappa statistic alone without 
adjustments for prevalence was appropriate and sufficient to assess inter-rater reliability 
for this study because the marginal totals for the 2 x 2 contingency table were relatively 
balanced (Cunningham, 2009). 
This study, which only considered nine PD type serious (Category A or B) 
runway incursion incidents, identified three incidents (33%) with aircraft states that did 
not trigger a SURF-IA alerting outcome.  Three of the 11 known limitations of the 
baseline SURF-IA model presented in Table 3 manifested themselves as factors in the 
non-alerting incidents: (a) wrong runway departures, (b) no alert if traffic enters runway 
after ownship lift-off from same runway, and (c) helicopter operations.  The limitations 
of the SURF-IA model were known by RTCA SC-186, which developed the SURF-IA 
SPR.  However, prior to this study, the validity of using RISC derived runway incursion 
statistics to measure SURF-IA effectiveness had not been explicitly identified or 
considered.  
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Seven of the nine incidents in this study involved the most prevalent aircraft state 
for runway incursions, which was when ownship aircraft entered a runway ahead of 
traffic aircraft departing or landing.  All were rated with a SURF-IA alerting outcome 
except for the incident that involved ownship entering the runway after the traffic on 
take-off from the same runway had lifted-off; this is a known limitation of the SURF-IA 
model where it does not alert for an incident classified as serious by the RISC model.  
The two other incidents that were rated with a SURF-IA non-alerting outcome also 
involved aircraft states that were known limitations of the SURF-IA model: wrong 
runway departures, and helicopter runway incursions.  Potential issues and solutions for 
the aircraft states outside the capability of the SURF-IA alerting model had been 
previously identified by Moertl et al. (2012, June), but they had not been considered in 
the context of harmonizing the SURF-IA outcomes with the RISC model. 
The on-runway condition for the SURF-IA model only extended the aircraft’s 
position to the runway shoulder, while the RISC model on-runway condition extended 
past the runway shoulder to the taxiway hold line (Figure 7).  A broader SURF-IA 
definition of an on-runway aircraft condition/state would provide a SURF-IA alerting 
outcome for an ownship aircraft entering a runway occupied by traffic aircraft on take-
off, even though the traffic may lift off prior to ownship actually crossing the runway 
shoulder.  The SURF-IA definition of on-runway is when the aircraft crosses the runway 
shoulder, while the RISC model defines an on-runway condition as anytime the aircraft is 
beyond the hold line for the runway (Figure 7). 
Single aircraft wrong runway departures were addressed by Moertl et al. (2012, 
June) who suggested that an ADS-B transponder could be placed on the approach and 
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departure ends of runways that were inactive, closed, or otherwise not in use, as mock 
traffic which would trigger a SURF-IA alert for an aircraft departing/arriving on the 
wrong runway.  The modified SURF-IA model, proposed by Moertl et al. (2012, June), 
interpreted a wrong runway departure as traffic on the runway. 
A wrong runway departure involving a single aircraft is classified as a serious 
runway incursion by the RISC model; however, the SURF-IA model only provides alerts 
for incidents involving two aircraft.  Hence, all runway incursion incidents from wrong 
runway departures, even if the aircraft were SURF-IA equipped, would reflect as an 
increase in rate and number of runway incursions.  The potentially misleading statistical 
analysis of the benefit of SURF-IA for runway incursion data when it fails to alert for 
wrong runway departures classified as serious by the RISC model, was estimated by 
looking at historical data for the number of wrong runway departures.  An FAA (2007, 
July) report on U.S. domestic wrong runway departures indicated that from CY 1981-CY 
2006 there were 696 incidents or accidents involving wrong runway operations.  These 
data were collected prior to the FAA adopting the ICAO definition of runway incursions 
that added wrong runway departures.  From FY 2008-FY 2013 (January), under the 
expanded definition of runway incursion, the ASIAS database recorded 23 wrong runway 
incidents.  All of the aforementioned runway incursions, which involved single aircraft 
wrong runway departures with a subsequent loss of separation from another aircraft, 
would have been classified by the RISC model as serious.  However, none would have 
resulted in a SURF-IA alerting outcome because the SURF-IA model does not provide 
alerts for incidents involving one aircraft.  Hence, these wrong runway departure 
incidents would have been interpreted as a failure of the SURF-IA technology. 
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The baseline version of SURF-IA was not intended for installation on helicopters; 
however, the incorporation of helicopter operations into the SURF-IA model was 
addressed by RTCA (2010) as follows: 
 
The performance and safety analysis did not analyze helicopter installations.  
Therefore, the assumption excludes this configuration from the scope of the 
application.  However, due to the similarity of surface operations of helicopters 
and airplanes while operating on standard airport surface elements such as 
runways and taxiways (helicopters on, or hovering above taxiways, holding short 
of runways, taking off and landing on runways, on approach to runways/pad) 
helicopters may actually be able to safely operate.  However, it is expected that a 
simple add-on safety analysis may be able to show that helicopters could safely 
operate SURF IA.  (RTCA, 2010, p. A-40) 
 
Joslin (2013) identified the following considerations for the SURF-IA helicopter 
add-on safety analysis recommended by RTCA (2010) SC-186: (a) air/ground 
determination for an airborne helicopter in a hover or hover taxiing; (b) helipads as a 
surface identified for take-off/landing, but not located on an actual runway surface; (c) 
helicopters entering/crossing runways from areas other than known taxiways; and (d) 
helicopters on approach to a runway, but not lined up with the runway centerline. 
Runway incursions were not confined to airplanes, and neither the number nor the 
rate of helicopter runway incursions has shown any appreciable reduction (Figure 21 and 
Figure 22).  However, the overall statistics for rates and number of runway incursions, as 
 
 
93 
 
published by the FAA Office of Runway Safety, do not distinguish between airplanes and 
helicopters.  Hence, the exclusion of valid SURF-IA alerting outcomes in ownship 
helicopters may influence the validity of runway incursion statistics, derived from the 
RISC model, as a measure of the effectiveness of SURF-IA technology for the reduction 
PD type runway incursions. 
 
Figure 21.  Number of helicopter runway incursions FY 2008-FY 2012.  Adapted from 
http://www.asias.faa.gov/ 
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Figure 22.  Rate of helicopter runway incursions per 10,000 operations, FY 2009-FY 
2012.  Adapted from https://aspm.faa.gov/tfms/ and ASIAS- http://www.asias.faa.gov/ 
 
 
 
Whereas the existing literature and previous studies did not define or follow a 
formal rigorous and repeatable process for validating metrics, this study developed a 
step-by-step methodology that filled the gap for assessing the validity of legacy/ 
traditional metrics for application to new technology (Table 19). 
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Table 19 
Step-by-step methodology for validating metrics for new technology 
 
1 Determine the intended function of the new technology.  For this study, the 
intended function of the new technology was the reduction in serious runway 
incursions. 
2 Identify the model for the traditional or legacy metric used to measure the outcome 
from the intended function of the new technology.  For this study, the RISC model 
was the legacy metric used for categorizing the severity of runway incursions. 
3 Identify the model for the new technology (e.g., SURF-IA). 
4 Identify the limitations of the technical capabilities of the new technology (e.g., 
SURF-IA model will not alert for single aircraft wrong runway departures). 
5 Identify any differences in definitions between the models (e.g., on-runway 
condition was defined differently in the RISC model versus the SURF-IA model). 
6 Identify expert raters in the field of the new technology. 
7 Gather archival data from actual cases of interest that have already been classified 
by the legacy/traditional metric.  For this study the cases of interest were pilot 
deviation type runway incursion incidents classified as serious (Category A or B) 
by the RISC model. 
8 Select a sufficient number of cases of interest to establish a statistically significant 
sample size. 
9 Have the expert raters apply the model for the new technology (e.g., SURF-IA) to 
the cases of interest, and determine the outcome from the new technology (e.g., 
alerting or non-alerting). 
10 Gather qualitative comments from the raters to: 
• explain why or how they determined their rating  
• provide lessons learned 
• identify which cases were most troublesome 
• recommend modifications to the model(s) 
11 Calculate the inter-rater reliability, and descriptive statistics (e.g., percentage 
agreement, counts. 
12 Identify the cases and conditions where the outcome from the metric used to 
measures the benefit of the new technology does not match the outcome from the 
new technology, as assessed by the expert raters.  The cases identified in this study 
were those where the SURF-IA model did not yield an outcome of a Warning or 
Caution alert for runway incursion incidents classified as serious (Category A or B) 
by the RISC model. 
13 Identify modifications to the model(s) that would harmonize the metrics with the 
outcome of the new technology. 
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Conclusions 
The study answered both research questions.  (1) Does the SURF-IA model yield 
an outcome of a Warning or Caution alert for runway incursion incidents classified as 
serious (Category A or B) by the FAA/ICAO RISC model?  The study revealed that the 
SURF-IA model did not yield an outcome of a Warning or Caution alert for all runway 
incursion incidents classified as serious (Category A or B) by the FAA/ICAO RISC 
model.  (2) What are the aircraft states in the SURF-IA model that preclude an outcome 
of a Warning or Caution alert for runway incursion incidents classified as serious 
(Category A or Category B) by the FAA/ICAO RISC model?  There were specific 
aircraft states in the baseline SURF-IA model that precluded an outcome of a Warning or 
Caution alert for runway incursion incidents classified as serious (Category A or 
Category B) by the FAA/ICAO RISC model: (a) wrong runway departures, (b) traffic 
entering the runway after ownship lift-off from same runway, and (c) helicopter 
operations.  This study also revealed how different outcome severities from the RISC and 
SURF-IA models may result in misleading information when using the reduction in 
serious runway incursion incidents, classified by the RISC model, as a metric for the 
benefit of SURF-IA technology. 
In FY 2012 there were 10 serious (Category A or B) pilot deviation type runway 
incursions, which was a tenfold increase over the one (1) runway incursion of this type 
and category reported in FY 2011.  This study used four of the ten incidents recorded in 
FY 2012, of which three were rated as non-alerting by the SURF-IA model.  If this study 
had assumed that all aircraft involved in the FY 2012 incidents had SURF-IA equipment 
installed, and then used the change in PD type runway incursions classified as serious by 
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the RISC model as a metric to assess the effectiveness and benefit of SURF-IA, at least 
three of the ten FY 2012 incidents would not have provided a SURF-IA alert.  Hence, the 
FY 2012 runway incident data would have been misleading by indicating that the SURF-
IA model was at best only 70% effective and beneficial in providing an alert to mitigate 
the hazard from runway incursions. 
However, the three incidents that were non-alerting involved three aircraft states 
identified in this study as not providing a SURF-IA alerting outcome for an incident 
classified as serious by the RISC model.  Even if the SURF-IA model had performed to 
design, the best it could have achieved would have been a 70% alerting outcome for 
incidents classified as serious by the legacy RISC model metric. 
This study demonstrated an innovative method of utilizing expert raters and actual 
high-risk incidents to identify the shortcomings of using legacy metrics to measure the 
effectiveness of new technology designed to mitigate hazardous incidents.  The 
expansion of the methodology used in this study to other areas lies in first identifying the 
known limitations and capabilities in the actual design of any new technology and then 
using expert raters to see if, and how, the outcomes from legacy metrics were affected.  If 
the model differences yield outcomes that do not match, the design of the new technology 
and/or the design of the metric for measuring the benefit of the new technology may need 
adjustment.  The overall implication from this study is that the implementation of new 
technology designed to mitigate a legacy hazard demands a concurrent re-assessment of 
the legacy metrics.  The methodology is generalizable and can be applied to other high-
risk areas, such as medicine, nuclear power plants, and other modes of transportation.  
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Recommendations 
Prior to the certification of SURF-IA for use on aircraft, it is recommended that 
further study with a larger number of PD type runway incursion incidents classified as 
serious (Category A or B) by the RISC model is conducted to identify other aircraft 
states and associated factors that do not trigger a SURF-IA alerting outcome.  It is also 
recommended that prior to using the ASIAS runway incursion data as a metric for the 
benefit of SURF-IA, the FAA develop a process for identifying and tracking ASIAS 
reported PD type serious runway incursion incidents which will not trigger an alerting 
outcome in the baseline SURF-IA.  Data from the runway incursion incidents for Cases 6, 
7, and 8 involving runway aircraft states not designed to trigger an alert by the baseline 
SURF-IA model should not be considered when assessing the effectiveness and benefit of 
the new SURF-IA technology for reducing runway incursion incidents.  However, 
consideration should be made to improving the SURF-IA model technical capabilities to 
accommodate all possible aircraft states that the RISC model would classify as serious 
(Category A or B) runway incursion incidents.
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APPENDIX A 
 
Permission to Conduct Research 
 
 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
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13-144 
 
 
Principle Investigator: Robert Edward Joslin 
Other Investigators:  
 
 
Project Title:  Examination of SURF-IA Alerting Outcomes for Serious Runway 
Incursion Incidents 
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Determination Date:  January 25, 2013 
 
 
Review Board Use Only 
 
Initial Reviewer:  Teri Vigneau/Bert Boquet 
 
Exempt:  X Yes    __ No     
 
Approved:  X Yes    ___ No 
 
Comments:  The purpose of this study will be to compare the outcomes of runway 
incursion severity classifications of serious derived from the FAA/ICAO RISC model 
and flight-deck alerts from SURF-IA flight deck equipage.  The research will utilize 
publically available reports and video re-enactments from the FAA Runway Safety 
Office and the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) system. Since 
this research is using existing data and there will be no risks to participants it may be 
determined to be exempt. [Teri Vigneau 1-10-13] 
 
This protocol is exempt. [Bert Boquet 1-17-13] 
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CONSENT FORM  
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
 
You are invited to participate in a research study related to runway incursions, which 
continue to be a source of risk to air transportation; the issue is well documented by the 
FAA, NTSB, ICAO, and other international organizations.  You were selected as a 
possible rater because you are an aviation professional with experience in flight-deck 
technology, and runway incursions.  We ask that you read this form and ask any 
questions you may have before agreeing to be a rater for this study.  The study is being 
conducted by Robert E. Joslin, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy in Aviation. 
STUDY PURPOSE 
The purpose of this study will be to compare the outcomes of runway incursion severity 
classifications of serious derived from the FAA/ICAO RISC model and flight-deck alerts 
from SURF-IA flight-deck equipage.  The research will utilize publically available 
reports and video re-enactments from the FAA Runway Safety Office and the Aviation 
Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) system. 
NUMBER OF PEOPLE TAKING PART IN THE STUDY: 
If you agree to participate, you will be one of a minimum of 2 raters who will be 
participating in this research by rating alerting outcomes from flight-deck equipage for 18 
runway incursion incidents. 
PROCEDURES FOR THE STUDY: 
If you agree to be a rater for this study, you will do the following things: 
1. Rate 18 runway incursion incidents within four weeks of receipt of a rater 
package by mail which will include a media storage device(flash drive) with 
videos and document files, as well as paper copies of the documents.  
2. Not reproduce or share any of the items and will return them to this investigator 
along with a completed rater matrix (Appendix B).  
3. Rate the incidents independently without discussion with any other person or 
reference to any other information.  
4. You will not be expected to travel to any location but will require a personal 
computer with word processing (.doc and .docx) and the ability to view video 
files (.swf, .exe, flashplayer, internet explorer).   
RISKS OF TAKING PART IN THE STUDY: 
There are no foreseeable risks associated with this project.  Your individual identity will 
not be included in the research study.  
BENEFITS OF TAKING PART IN THE STUDY: 
There are no direct benefits for taking part in the study. 
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CONFIDENTIALITY 
Efforts will be made to keep your personal information confidential.  We cannot 
guarantee absolute confidentiality.  Your personal information may be disclosed if 
required by law.  Your identity will be held in confidence in reports in which the study 
may be published and databases in which results may be stored. 
PAYMENT 
You will not receive payment for taking part in this study.  
CONTACTS FOR QUESTIONS OR PROBLEMS 
For questions about the study, contact the principal investigator Robert Joslin at (682) 
XXX-XXX. 
For questions about your rights as a research participant or to discuss problems, 
complaints or concerns about a research study, or to obtain information, contact the 
ERAU Senior Grants Analyst,Teri Vigneau, Corsair Hall Room 203C,(386) 226-7179 or 
at hollerat@erau.edu. 
VOLUNTARY NATURE OF STUDY 
Taking part in this study is voluntary.  You may choose not to take part or may withdraw 
consent and discontinue participation at any time without prejudice.  Your decision 
whether or not to participate in this study will not affect your current or future relations 
with the principal investigator. 
SUBJECT'S CONSENT 
I acknowledge that I have had the opportunity to obtain additional information regarding 
the study and that any questions I have raised have been answered to my full satisfaction.  
I have also read and fully understand the consent form and sign it freely and voluntarily. 
In consideration of all of the above, I give my consent to participate in this research 
study. 
I will print a copy of this informed consent document to keep for my records and mail the 
original to the investigator.  My signature below indicates that I agree to take part in this 
study. 
First Name:__________________Last Name:___________________Title:________ 
Organization/Agency Name:_____________________________________________ 
 
Tel:______________________Email:____________________________ 
 
Signature/Date:____________________________________________ 
 
Principal Investigator Signature/Date:__________________________________ 
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Table B1 
Pilot study data collection sheet 
 
Date:    Total Time to Complete: 
Rater  Name: √ Check One Box 
Only. Indicate Grid 
Reason Code (e.g. E3) 
Comments True 
Rating 
Event # Airport  
ID 
Date of 
Event 
Ownship 
Model & 
Call Sign 
SURF-IA  
Alert 
SURF-IA 
 No Alert 
 Alert or 
No Alert 
Example XYZ Date C172 
N333RJ 
 Z1 Additional comments 
on reason for rating 
Alert 
1 ABE 19-Sep-08 CRJ700 
AS7138 
   Alert 
2 SAN 16-Jan-08 B737 
SW1626 
   Alert 
3 FAT 28-Aug-08 CRJ200 
SKW69R 
   Alert 
4 CLT 29-May-09 CRJ200 
JIA390 
   Alert 
5 ATW 24-Jul-11 EMB145 
BTA6131 
   Alert 
6 SFO 26-May-07 ERJ170 
RPA4912 
   Alert 
7 TUS 2-Jun-06 F-16 
Banshee1 
   Alert 
8 HNL 14-Aug-09 B767 
HAL9 
   Alert 
9 UGN 24-Jul-04 C172 
N405ES 
   Alert 
 
 
A
PPE
N
D
IX
 B
 
D
ata C
ollection D
evices 
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Table B2 
Data collection sheet 
 
Date:    Total Time to Complete: 
Rater  Name: √ Check One Box 
Only. Indicate Grid 
Reason Code (e.g. E3) 
Comments 
Event # Airport  
ID 
Date of 
Event 
Ownship 
Model & 
Call Sign 
SURF-IA  
Alert 
SURF-IA 
 No Alert 
 
Example XYZ Date C172 E3  Additional comments on reason for rating 
1 CHS 18-Dec-09 CRJ200 
AS5510 
   
2 DAB 24-Nov-07 C182 
N2438F 
   
3 DEN 5-Jan-07 SW4 
LYM4216 
   
4 DVT 18-Jan-09 PA28 
Trans922 
   
5 GFK 4-Jun-12 C210 
N777JK 
   
6 HWO 29-Feb-12 C172 
N64238 
   
7 HPN 4-Dec-11 B407 
N408TD 
   
8 MKE 11-Mar-12 C750 
FIV702 
   
9 JFK 6-Jul-05 B767 
ISRAIR 102 
   
 
 
115 
 
APPENDIX C 
 
Tables 
 
 
 
Table C1 
Number of subjects required in a 2-rater study to detect a statistically significant k (p ≤ 
.05).  
 
 
Note: Adapted from Sim, J., & Wright, C. C. (2005). “The kappa statistic in reliability studies: Use, 
interpretation, and sample size requirements,” by  J. Sim and C.C. Wright, 2005, Journal of the American 
Physical Therapy Association, 85(3), 257-268. 
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Table C2 
 
Pilot study rater reason code equivalencies 
 
 
Event # 
Airport 
ID 
Rater A Reason Code Description Rater B Reason Code Description Explanation of  equivalency 
1 
ABE 
F12-Traffic taxiing on centerline 
of same runway  
F10-Traffic after landing rollout on 
same runway 
The aircraft state for an aircraft that has 
just landed would be considered landing 
rollout until the groundspeed is ≤ 40 
knots at which time the aircraft state 
becomes taxiing on-runway (lined up). 
3 
FAT 
G13- Traffic after landing rollout 
on same runway 
G10- Traffic taxiing on centerline of 
same runway  
The aircraft state for an aircraft that has 
just landed would be considered landing 
rollout until the groundspeed is ≤ 40 
knots at which time the aircraft state 
becomes taxiing on-runway (lined up). 
5 
ATW 
A1- Traffic on Approach to same 
Runway as Ownship, with ≤ 35 
secs to runway threshold 
A2- Traffic on Approach to same 
Runway as Ownship, with ≤ 15 secs 
to runway threshold 
Temporal assessment of the aircraft time 
to cross the runway threshold (RTHRE) 
during an approach; warning alert if ≤ 
15 seconds to RTHRE, or a caution alert 
if ≤ 35 seconds to RTHRE. 
6 
SFO 
C4-Ownship landing and Traffic 
taking off from intersecting 
runways 
F16-Ownship taking off and Traffic 
landing from intersecting runways 
An examination of the SURF-IA logic 
diagrams derived from RTCA (2010) 
DO-323 indicated that the aircraft state 
codes were redundant, hence 
interchangeable. 
9 
UGN 
D4-Traffic and Ownship taking 
off from intersecting runways 
F18-Ownship and Traffic taking off 
on intersecting runways 
An examination of the SURF-IA logic 
diagrams derived from RTCA (2010) 
DO-323 indicated that the aircraft state 
codes were redundant, hence 
interchangeable. 
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Figure D1.  Example screen shots from runway incursion video reenactment data.  Adapted from FAA RI Database 
http://www.faa.gov/airports/runway_safety/videos/ 
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ASIAS BRIEF REPORT  
 
 
GENERAL INFORMATION  
 Data Source:   
RUNWWAY SAFETY OFFICE - RUNWAY 
INCURSIONS  
 Event Id:   5826  
 FAA Event Type:   PD  
 Event LCL Date:   24-NOV-07  
 Event LCL Time:   1556  
 Event State:   FL  
 RI Category Rank:   A  
 Airport Id:   DAB  
 Event Location:   DAYTONA BEACH INTL, FL  
 Event Lndg/Tkoff Surface:   RWY 7L  
 Aircraft 1 Type:   C182  
 Aircraft 2 Type:   BE20  
 Aircraft 1 FAR:   91  
 Aircraft 2 FAR:   91  
 Weather Condition:   9 SM SCT 026TCU BKN 055 BKN 100 CALM 
 
 
ANALYSIS DESCRIPTION  
 
A CESSNA C182 WAS TAXIED TO RUNWAY 7L INTERSECTION N5 FOR 
DEPARTURE. THE C182 THEN CROSSED 7L AT N5 WITHOUT CLEARANCE 
AND CONFLICTED WITH A BEECH BE20 ON DEPARTURE ROLL 7L FROM 
ABEAM P2, APPROXIMATELY 3,000 FEET WEST OF N5. ATCT ADVISED THE 
C182 OF THE IMPROPER CROSSING AND THE PILOT MADE A 180 TO EXIT. 
THE BE20 CONTINUED DEPARTURE ROLL AND AS IT PASSED N5 AND THE 
C182 WAS JUST ABOUT OFF THE RUNWAY. THE BE20 STATED HE WAS 
COMMITTED TO DEPART WHEN HE SAW THE C182. THE C182 PILOT SAID 
HIS BRAKES STUCK. CLOSEST HORIZONTAL PROXIMITY REPORTED WAS 70 
FEET.  
 
 
 
END REPORT 
Figure D2.  ASIAS brief report example. 
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APPENDIX E 
 
Instructions to Raters 
 
INSTRUCTIONS TO RATERS 
The following files are included on the attached flash drive under the folder name “Rater 
Package-Pilot Study”.  The “ASIAS Brief Report” file is provided to supplement the 
video reenactments.  After observing each video reenactment and reading the associated 
ASIAS report, please rate each event as either alerting or non-alerting following the 
SURF-IA logic diagrams, starting with Figure 1.  The SURF-IA logic diagrams and a 
data collection sheet are provided under the files named “SURF-IA Logic Diagrams”. 
and “Data Collection Device” respectively.  A sample data entry is provided on the data 
collection sheet.  Please do not open the folder named “Rater Package-Final Study” until 
notified by the researcher.  All of the other procedures on the Consent Form apply unless 
otherwise stated. 
Thank you for your participation! 
 
 
Figure E1.  Instructions to raters (pilot study). 
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INSTRUCTIONS TO RATERS 
The following files are included on the attached flash drive under the folder name “Rater 
Package-Final Study”.  The “ASIAS Brief Report” file is provided to supplement the 
video reenactments.  After observing each video reenactment and reading the associated 
ASIAS report, please rate each event as either alerting (with reason code) or non-alerting 
following the SURF-IA logic diagrams, starting with Figure 1.  The SURF-IA logic 
diagrams and a data collection sheet are provided under the files named “SURF-IA Logic 
Diagrams” and “Data Collection Device” respectively.  A sample data entry is provided 
on the data collection sheet.  For this study the aircraft state for an aircraft that has just 
landed should be considered landing rollout until the groundspeed is ≤ 40 knots at which 
time the aircraft states becomes taxiing on runway (lined up).  Also a typographical error 
was corrected in the last column header for Ownship in the SURF-IA Logic Diagram 
(Figure 3)  to read lined-up instead of not lined-up.  All of the other procedures on the 
Consent Form apply unless otherwise stated. 
Thank you for your participation! 
 
Figure E2.  Instructions to raters.
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Table F1 
Pilot study rater data 
 
Data Collection Date(s) 
January 25, 2013 –February 3, 2013 
Alert/No Alert True  
Score 
Comments 
Reason Code 
Event # Airport  
ID 
Date of 
Event 
Ownship 
Model & 
Call Sign 
Rater 
A 
Rater 
B 
Rater A and Rater B 
1 ABE 19-Sep-
08 
CRJ700 
AS7138 
Alert Alert Alert No comments from raters 
F12 F10 
2 SAN 16-Jan-08 B737 
SW1626 
Alert Alert Alert Rater B- Conflict aircraft was stopped prior 
to B737 initiating take-off roll F12 F12 
3 FAT 28-Aug-
08 
CRJ200 
SKW69R 
Alert Alert Alert Rater B- Assumed that the landing state is 
defined as > 40 knots, per example in 
RTCA/DO-323, page A-16, therefore H12. 
G13 G10/H12 
4 CLT 29-May-
09 
CRJ200 
JIA390 
Alert Alert Alert Rater A-Cannot determine GS of JIA390 
when PC12 enters runway. If GS was >80 
kts, no alert would be issued 
F1 F1 
5 ATW 24-Jul-11 EMB145 
BTA6131 
Alert Alert Alert Rater B-EMB145 would have triggered these 
three alert cells consecutively A1 A2/B3/C3 
6 SFO 26-May-
07 
ERJ170 
RPA4912 
Alert Alert Alert No comments from raters 
C4 F16 
7 TUS 2-Jun-06 F-16 
Banshee1 
Alert Alert Alert No comments from raters 
E3 E3 
8 HNL 14-Aug-
09 
B767 
HAL9 
Alert Alert Alert Rater B-B767 would receive alert while on 
approach (G13, then G12) and also after 
touch down (H12) 
G13 G13/G12/
H12 
9 UGN 24-Jul-04 C172 
N405ES 
Alert Alert Alert No comments from raters 
D4 F18 
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Table F2 
Rater data 
Data Collection Date(s) 
February 12, 2013 –February 15, 2013 
Alert/No Alert Comments 
Reason Code 
Event # Arpt  
ID 
Date of 
Event 
Ownship 
Model & 
Call Sign 
Rater A Rater 
B 
Rater A and Rater B 
ASIAS ID 
1 CHS 18-Dec-09 CRJ200 
AS5510 
Alert Alert No comments from raters 
8173 F1 F1 
2 DAB 24-Nov-07 C182 
N2438F 
Alert Alert No comments from raters 
5826 E3 E3 
3 DEN 5-Jan-07 SW4 
LYM421
6 
Alert Alert Rater A-Alert first due to I7, then later due to I6 
Rater B-I7 followed by I6 4828 I7,I6 I7, I6 
4 DVT 18-Jan-09 PA28 
Trans922 
Alert Alert Rater A-This was close to no alert, looked as if Trans415 lifted off as 922 enters 
runway 7167 E3 E3 
5 GFK 4-Jun-12 C210 
N777JK 
Alert Alert Rater A- Hard to tell when N777JK within SURF IA approach corridor, if not in 
corridor until <15 sec to threshold then G12 11322 G13/G12 G12 
6 HWO 29-Feb-12 C172 
N64238 
No Alert No 
Alert 
Rater A-No alert because departing aircraft lifted off before N64238 crosses hold 
line 
(1)Rater B- A basic SURF-IA implementation per DO-323 minimum would not 
identify this part of the crossing taxiway as part of the runway because it is 
located beyond the runway threshold. 
10923 Z4 (1) 
7 HPN 4-Dec-11 B407 
N408TD 
No Alert No 
Alert 
(2)Rater A- E10 based in information given.  Based on DO-323, there would be no 
alert on helicopter because SURF IA not approved for operation on helicopters. 
(3) Rater B- A basic SURF-IA implementation per DO-323 minimum would not 
have been installed on helicopters as DO-323 did not include safety and 
performance requirements for helicopter installations. However, an advanced 
SURF-IA installation could have been installed on helicopters. In that case, the 
alert would have triggered cell E10. 
10675 (2) (3) 
8 MKE 11-Mar-12 C750 
FIV702 
No Alert No 
Alert 
No comments from raters 
10969 Z1 Z1 
9 JFK 6-Jul-05 B767 
ISRAIR 
102 
Alert Alert No comments from raters 
3374 
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APPENDIX G 
Follow-up Questionnaire for Raters 
Follow-up Questionnaire for Raters 
Rater 
Name: 
 Date:  Time to 
Complete: 
 
 
Please provide a written response to each of the questions below by typing in your 
response immediately below each question and return via email to joslinr@my.erau.edu.  
Your Consent Form will extend to this Questionnaire, unless otherwise requested. 
 
1.  In Event 6 with ASIAS ID 10923 you rated the incident as non-alerting because 
the traffic aircraft was not in an “on-runway” state, based on the SURF-IA model 
definition, until after the aircraft on take-off from the runway had lifted off.  
(ASIAS ID 10923 report and video reenactment file are attached for your 
reference) 
 
(a) How would you have rated the incident using the  RISC model definition of 
“on-runway” as depicted in Figure 1 below? Please explain why. 
RESPONSE: 
 
(b) How would you define an “off-runway” condition for an aircraft clearing the 
running on to a taxiway? 
RESPONSE: 
 
2. What, if any, lessons learned did you gain while rating the incidents?  
RESPONSE: 
 
3. What other applications, aviation or otherwise, might benefit from using expert 
raters to rate the outcomes from new technology? 
RESPONSE: 
 
4. What other applications, aviation or otherwise, might benefit from validating their 
legacy metrics for assessing the benefits or performance of new technology? 
RESPONSE: 
 
5. What scenarios created the most doubt in your response? 
RESPONSE: 
 
6. What recommendations would you make for methodologies of future studies 
seeking similar expert ratings? 
RESPONSE: 
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7. What recommendations do you have for modifying one or both of the model(s) 
(RISC and/or SURF-IA) to harmonize the outcomes? 
RESPONSE: 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  U.S. Airport Surface Geometry On-runway points.  Adapted from “Safety, 
performance and interoperability requirements document for enhanced traffic situational 
awareness on the airport surface with indications and alerts (SURF-IA),” by RTCA, 
2010, “Runway Safety Program,” by FAA, 2010.“Airport Design,” by FAA, 1989. 
 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR CONTRIBUTION TO THIS STUDY 
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